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FAMILIAR WORDS

AS AFFECTING

THE CHARACTER OF ENGLISHMEN

AND

THE FATE OF ENGLAND.

BY

DAVID URQUHART.

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1855.

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FAMILIAR WORDS,

AS AFFECTING THE CHARACTER OF ENGLISHMEN AND THE FATE OF ENGLAND.

Exec 17

BY

DAVID URQUHART.

LONDON:

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NOTICE.

Shortly will appear the Second Part, containing those *Familiar Words* which chiefly influence the Conduct of England in 1855.

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PREFACE.

SOCRATES AND THE SOPHISTS.*

> " Σόφος μὲν, ὁ πόλλα ἔιδως φυᾷ,
> Μάθοντες δὲ, λάβροι παγγλωσσιᾷ,
> Κόρακες ὥς ἄκραντα γαρῦεμεν
> Δίος πρὸς ὄρνικα Θεῖον."

Children do make inventions to play withal. Men are the sport of the inventions they make. Thus children make cats' cradles—men make philosophy. Children take off the threads from their fingers and wind them into another shape, and again another, and the game is ended, and the string is untied. But men when they tie knots do never untie them, but bind themselves and their children from generation to generation.

In Greece first was known the art of tying knots,† and the Sophists made nets to catch men, who, when they went forth to walk, stumbled and fell. Then the people said, " Let us, too, catch men;" and they went to the Sophists, and said, teach us to catch men even as we are caught; and the Sophists taught how two men could play with nets, both making nets, and

* Adopted as preface from the *Portfolio*, in 1844.

† Ἀναλύειν, whence our *analysis* is " to untie."

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both being caught in each other's net, and his own, each catching the other, and each catching himself. Then when they fell, they made more nets, and every man who came by fell and made more nets, and those who saw from afar were caught, for the net went round and round the city. And those who fled were taken in another city, and those only escaped who fled into another country,—that is, another tongue. For, lo! Words were the nets.*

And men praised greatly the Sophists for teaching them the nets, and rewarded them with great rewards.

And the Sophists did knit; yea, and they did net.

And they called the nets after their names, and the new nets after his own name.

Then came a cunning man named Socrates, and he did handle the nets, and did see how they had been tied, and he did pick out the meshes, and he did untie the knots, and he cried aloud, "Oh foolish people, the spider maketh nets, but catcheth not spiders; and the spider spreadeth her web, but she catcheth not herself." And some he set free, and he taught them how they too could untie the knots.

And the Sophists, when they saw that he too had disciples, came all with their nets, but Socrates did untie every net, and some he took and threw on them their own net, and he said unto the people, "Behold the spider is caught in his web, and the flies are free; be ye not now more foolish than the

* The *silence* of Pythagoras, the *questions* of Socrates, the *inventions* of Plato, Aristotle, &c.

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flies, for the flies weave not webs to catch themselves for the spider." Nevertheless they would not be free, for they made more nets out of those Socrates had untied, and when he came again and set them free, they cried, "This man hath destroyed the work of our hands, and the glory of our works, and the teachers of our children."

And they killed Socrates, and his disciples fled.

Then were they in trouble because of the nets, and they mourned for Socrates, and they called to his disciples "Come and teach us how Socrates did untie the nets."

Then one of his disciples said, "Thus did Socrates untie the nets." And that disciple made the nets of the Sophists, and said, "Thus did Socrates net;" and the people rejoiced, for they loved the nets; albeit they mourned for Socrates.

And this disciple was by name called Plato.

And Plato was worse than the Sophists, for the people knew not that they were nets; for the voice of Plato seemed to them as the voice of Socrates. And the nets were greater than those of the Sophists, and every way that Socrates took to untie them Plato made more nets of the untying; and they are called after Plato.

But after Socrates nothing was called.

Then arose a disciple of Plato, and said, "I will untie the nets of Plato, and I will shew how Socrates untied the nets." And his name was Aristotle. And Aristotle untied some of the nets of Plato, and of them made new nets. And he died; but his dis-

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ciples made more nets of the nets of Aristotle than did the disciples of Plato of the nets of Plato.

And they remain unto this day, both of Plato and Aristotle, and they are called after their names; but those of their disciples are greater, but they, too, are called after Plato, and after Aristotle: and they are unto this day.

And new people arose, and new tongues, and the confusion was greater, and the nets were over all: for into the new tongues they brought the knots of the old tongues, and the nets of the old; and there was no untying the nets, for the old were brought into the new, and they were tied one with the other, and when they tried to untie with the old, as they thought Socrates did untie, they made greater in the old. And it was pulling hither, and pulling thither; and one strong man did pull many one way, and one strong man did pull many another way. Then came fightings, and wars, aud overthrowings which they call revolutions, and they fought because of the nets, and with the nets, and no one untied them, but they fought. For, lo! the knots were in their hearts, and therefore did they hate each other.

And they called them "Philosophy," and "Systems," and "Doctrines," and "Schools," and "Sects," and "Principles," and "Ages," and "Eras," and "Light," and "New Lights," and "Progress," and "Developements," and "March of Intellect," and "Civilization," and "Diffusion of knowledge," and they called them all also after men's names, and after each man's name, they called them "*Isms*," and

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"*Ites*," and great was the confusion, and every man's hand was against every man, because of the crying aloud of the "Isms" and the "Ites" against the "Isms" and the "Ites," for all were called after men's names.

And great was the uproar, and the crying aloud, and the striving, and the ill-speaking of the Isms and Ites against the Isms and Ites; and it was the "this question," and "that question," and "this cause," and "that cause," and the "rights of this," and "the wrongs of that," and "justice for this," and "justice for that," and the "this in danger," and the "that in danger," because of the pulling and the striving, and the falling and the fighting of the Isms and the Ites. But Socrates had none called after his name, for he was a witness to the truth.*

But the knots were in men's hearts, because they were on their lips, and so it was, that by asking men "What mean ye when ye say this idle thing," that Socrates shewed unto them that these words were idle; but they who knew not that the thing was idle, how could they ask such questions? Nevertheless, they saw, that it was by putting questions that he untied knots, and they said, "Let us, too, put questions;" and then said they, "We have possessed a great treasure," and they called it "Process," and this was "*the Socratic mode of reasoning*," being in the Greek tongue Ειρωνεια. But it profited not to them to ask questions, for Socrates was a wise man,

* "*The Witness of God*," so is Socrates named in the early fathers.

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and asked questions that were wise, and they being foolish men, asked questions that were foolish. Then scoffed they at their own invention, and in latter times they called it "Irony."*

* Η του Σωκρατους Ειρωνεια—the putting of men back upon their words,—had in Socrates' own time received the sense which we convey by "Irony."

N.B.—Part I of the subjoined Essays were written and published in 1844, and were made applicable to the events of that period. Part II, in like manner, refer to those of 1855.

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FAMILIAR WORDS.

I.—PRELIMINARY.

In no point is the contrast so striking and direct between a state in its rise, and a state in its decay, as in the estimation of speech. In the first the word of man is of all things the most solemn and sacred:* it is reverently dealt with and sparingly used. In the last, it is devoid of power, it is a by-word of reproach,† and poured forth with endless volubility. By the condition of the language we may estimate the period of the nation.

It is by thoughts that States are built up. It is by thoughts that States are brought down. But thoughts pass through speech, and speech is a matter of habit. Just thoughts require a simple tongue: fallacious terms must bring erring thoughts. Thought cannot undergo change in itself. Speech undergoes change in itself. Nations then are changed by their speech. The soul of man is in his words; the fate of a nation in its sentences, and yet the change as it occurs is not the result of will.

To bend the mind of a nation verging to decay, to

* In Greek and Latin "word" is singularly coupled with justice and glory—Dico, Δικη—Lex, Λογος—Fama, φημι. In the Slave tongues, "language" and "glory" are synonimous.

† "Words, words, words."—*Shakespeare.*

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observe its speech, is the only chance for its recovery. To effect this in the whole people is beyond the reach of human enterprise, but some individuals may be found at once inclined to, and capable of the effort. These, by this acquired superiority, may come to direct it in the sense which it would itself follow if its vision were not confused. Whether or not, at least this is possible, that some may be benefited, and a chain of witnesses preserved for future times.

If a man be stopped by a body of running water, he does not merely wonder at the phenomenon, but forms to himself the idea of a river, rising in the summits of the earth, speeding by descent, enlarged by time, and finding no goal short of the abyss of ocean. Speech too is a running stream, descending from the generations of old; shall we not ask what lands it has traversed—what leaps it has taken—what changes undergone?

We drink language as we do water: on the purity of the one depends the health of the mind, as that of the body on the purity of the other. Our natural senses warn us against the impurity of the latter, but we have to create for ourselves the senses by which to detect the impurities of the former. When language is corrupted it intoxicates, and it is corrupted by the putrefaction of perished races which have been cast into it. All the history of the past flows in upon us in our speech—not by lessons, but by symbols. If it were not so, could nations perish? Their hour of death is the rich accomplishment of experience.

Every sentence depends on two distinct processes; the syntax of the language; the operation of the mind. To distinguish the part that belongs to each is an operation of such difficulty, that it is only in the course of many generations, that we find evidence of

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the existence of an individual who has so much as thought of the distinction Syntax, which is wholly distinct from ourselves, having been taught us together with the use of words, by means of which, we think, we identify our phrases with the operations of the human mind.

Mutations arise chiefly from the introduction of new terms. These are derived from dead languages and falsely applied. They are moreover abstractions, that destroy the sense of living agency, and give to men's acts the character of vicissitudes, in which their will has no part, and over which their reason has no control.

I propose to trace the history of some of the most common words, which indeed is no less than the history of the nation in its mind. They may be classed under three heads. Those derived from the learned languages, and used in a sense in which the Romans or Greeks could never have employed them—those representing confused ideas—those applied to known things, but rendered confused by change in the objects represented.

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II.—GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.

FROM having spent much of my life in the East, I remark in ourselves, important matters which, by being common, escape observation. That which strikes me most is the reflection which an educated man gives utterance to when any particular fact is mentioned. As an Eastern I should have to infer that he wanted to get rid of the subject, but as a European I know that he is conversing upon it. In the one capacity I must conclude that he is ingeniously contriving to prevent a listener from understanding the value of the fact, but in the other I know that he is showing how dexterously he is discussing it. This process is called "*accounting for things*," and it is effected by uttering a GENERAL PROPOSITION.

General is the antithesis to particular, and to propose anything generally in reference to that which is specific, is not to explain, but to obliterate. A general proposition may be asserted or denied: consequently when any fact is merged in a generality, the discussion then proceeds to the total exclusion of the facts out of which it arises. Conversation so conducted, must be a practice, conducive to the sharpening of the wits, but fatal to sense. It is dictionaries that converse, not men.

Soon after returning for the first time from the East, in conversation with a distinguished political economist, I mentioned to him, the reflections which the hospitality there practised had suggested to me, and pointed out the social, political, and commercial effects which flowed from it, effects which we vainly

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sought amongst ourselves to realize by legislation. Whilst I was expecting to see these thoughts take possession of his powerful and reflecting mind, and with some tremor anticipated the series of searching inquiries to which I should be exposed, I was confounded by "*Hospitality is an effect of Barbarism.*" Recovering however, I made a second attempt. His great field was the Poor-laws. I therefore gave him a home-thrust and said,—"In these countries pauperism is unknown." Quick as lightning came his reply: "*Pauperism is a concomitant of Civilization!*" I then said "ye are slaves" in my heart, for my lips had not then gained sufficient courage.

According to Aristotle "generalities are the refuge of weak minds." According to Lord Coke, it is the deceitful that have recourse to them. Both propositions are true. They are invented by the designing, and are used by the weak. There would be little art in being fallacious if not to purpose, and a nation that has allowed itself to be so imposed upon must in the end become absolutely idiotic.

Müller remarks that our ideas of what we call civilization disqualify us for judging of any ancient people. But alas! it is from judging of ourselves that we are disqualified by our modes of speech. Suppose that it was not our habit to utter general propositions what would be the effect of hearing that the blot of pauperism was not a general condition of humanity? An effort would be called for to comprehend its causes, and to devise a remedy. By the habit, we exclude the fact, and what is worse, falling into details and into statistics, give to our mental atrophy the fence of figures and the mask of science.

When the habit of uttering propositions, containing

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the names of fanciful beings, has taken possession of a man, his thoughts become the domain of mere Chance, and his brain is left at the mercy of the accidental movements of his lips.

Civilization and Barbarism are not terms for agents, and therefore cannot account for results. Civilization is an abstraction of the things observed around us; we might as well say "Englandism," but as it is not yet used, those who do account for the absence of Pauperism by Barbarism, would perceive the absurdity of accounting for the Affghan war by Englandism.

In like manner we speak of the childhood, manhood, and old age of a nation, and so unconsciously refer its good or bad conduct to natural causes. No man refers to infancy the growth or to necessity the bankruptcy of a mercantile firm. If merchants conceived that profits or failure came by a law of nature, there would be an end of care and industry. General propositions are the refuge of ignorance from study, or of guilt from scrutiny, and can never be uttered regarding things that are understood.

An animal is born into the world without its knowledge; its increase is not of its will; its organs and its powers are not of its own making; its decay no care can prevent, and its dissolution no power avert.

The aggregation of men into one nation exists by its will; its functions are adjusted by its sense; its fortune depends on its deserts; its dissolution is brought about by its acts, not because the men die, but because the requisite attention is not given.

The childhood of man is ignorant and helpless: the early period of a nation is energetic and cognizant. The last years of a man, breaking through age, are feeble and sluggish, seeking only repose, con-

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temptuous of the present, and living only in recollections of the past: the last years of a nation present vehement agitation and contention; it lives only in the present, and is forgetful and contemptuous of all that has preceded it.

The infancy and old age of nations are then the reverse of the same periods in individuals. How could they be confounded?—by the habit of General Propositions; whence it follows that the notion was absurd that it was the virtues of the fathers which built up the State or that it is the vices of the sons that bring it to decay.

Pascal makes the performance of every duty, civil and religious, to depend upon the accuracy of our terms. This is to say, that all things, human and divine, being taught by speech, are known to us only in words; if we may connect his reasoning with the doctrines of his sect, his meaning is, that error is so deeply imbedded in us that to attempt to draw distinct lines between right and wrong is an absurdity or a pretence.*

The Scripture tells us that it is that which goeth forth from a man that defiles him. His *first* defilement is, therefore, from that which goeth forth, for if already defiled, he would not be to be defiled. This defilement lies not in his will, for then would he be already filthy. Something proceeding from a man not yet impure returns on himself to pollute him.

Ask the teachers of the land to interpret these

* Sir Graves Houghton, in his 'Prodromus,' (a work in which, by the assistance of Brahminical philosophy and Sanscrit terminology, a modern European is exhibited endeavouring to clamber by words out of the sphere of words), says, that he is conscious that he is subdued by the words he uses, but that in each particular case it requires a great effort to see how it is so.

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words, and they will say, "it is a slander or falsehood." A man can only speak as he knows, and only read what he thinks in the words that are written. How can the stream defile its source? An impure source is not to be defiled by its own stream. False and lying words are but the external symbols of the internal wickedness; before falsehood could have passed the lips, the man must have been altogether a lie within. This then is not the meaning of Christ; nor can this defilement be comprehended by those who are defiled. His words ascend to the causes of the darkening of the understanding; they refer not to things done wilfully, but to that which misleads the will, and point to the mist raised by the breath which abuses the mind of its sight.

Against conscious sin we have protections from within and from without; against unconscious error denunciation is of no avail; conscience is asleep; here we can only appeal to man's own use of his judgment, where its functions are not perverted; taking his habits of reasoning where he is right (which had never been observed by him) and contrasting them with the process he has followed where he has erred. This is what Christ has taught us to do—this is what He has done Himself, when He reproves the Pharisee for not succeeding in one mental operation when he had succeeded in another. They could not read the signs of the times, they *could* discern the face of the sky!

But men smile at connecting "duty," or "sin," with a mode of expression. They say, "If you examine your words—if you are captious about terms, you must give us a new dictionary." They say, "Our terms are intelligible, and that is enough; they are what every one uses, and what more can we want?"

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Language is a source of original as well as of representative error, whenever it is itself accidentally corrupted by the introduction of foreign words. Listen to any argumentation in English, and withdraw terms of Latin and Greek origin—replace personifications by the equivalent *verb*, and it will then prove not easy to disagree. An error may be the result of a fallacy introduced yesterday, or of an erroneous expression introduced a thousand years ago. So soon as the error arises, it is reproduced in language, and the tongue of the nation which renders it perpetuates it. At each period the terms in use pass to the child before a conscious mental operation is performed; once accepted, no further mental operation is in his power, except as flowing from and dependent upon them.

The child brings into the world the disposition qualifying him to belong to the best and noblest times. But he is taught down to the times in which he is born. The Child is as the simple man. We connect the idea of simplicity with that of integrity—we could not connect simplicity with fallacy, no more than we could connect it with loquacity. Instruct the simple man in the verbal superfluity of the times, and the qualities we admire in him will disappear. The young generation as it rises has transferred to it the contamination of the adult generation, and thus are the sins of the fathers accumulated upon the children.

Let us take one illustration more from the fallacy already noticed. There is no law of existence for a nation, no finite dimensions for its limbs, nor limited epoch for its life, yet by a merely habitual sentence, we personify a nation, as a living animal, destined to grow and condemned to perish. This personification is the

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infraction of no law, yet it brings the violation of all law, by destroying in each man who utters it all appreciation of his people's character and conduct. It shuts out from his own conscience the sense of his own responsibility,* and debars him, if self-consistent, from the reflections the most elevating as well as the most solemn, the most necessary as well as the most attractive.

A true citizen knows the State only in his own breast—sinking in his failings, and flourishing in his good qualities, and nothing can tend more to recover that lost sense than by reflecting on the rise and fall of states, and connecting therewith their cause—the character of the men.

What a rare occurrence is the rise of a State. For many thousand years the earth has been inhabited; many hundreds of millions of human beings live upon it at each moment, and are rapidly substituted in generation for generation. Amongst these myriads of millions how few have arisen to sway, to mould the minds of their fellow-citizens, and to create nations by instituting laws! It is by units that they are to be counted. Look again from East to West, and from North to South, and search over the annals of times, and see how many nations there are who in reference to subsequent expansion, may be said to have had a childhood. Again, you will have to count by units! And how diverse in character these pre-eminent nations. For instance, the Hindoos, Romans, Anglo-Saxons, Moguls, Chinese, Peruvians, Russians. The Roman just, the

* There is no man brought to the gallows who is not deplored as being unfortunate, because he has been ill-taught and led away. That does not alter the commandments of Heaven, or the laws of man.

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Mogul ferocious, the Chinese meek, the Hindoo obedient, the Anglo-Saxon rapacious, the Russian insatiable, and all great. Some governed by a king, some by a republic, some by an oligarchy, some by a priesthood—each most diversified form of government, beside each most diversified character of man. It is not then courage or cowardice—it is not honesty or villany—it is nothing in fact of the things we speak of as constituting *individual character*, that is the cause of a nation's rise; neither is it the form of government—since nations have arisen equally under every form. The characters which raise and preserve a state, are knowledge of its business, care of its interests—the sense of responsibility of each for each and of each for the state. The Roman, the Hindoo, &c. is different in the way that animals belonging to distinct genera differ. Their differences too were no more known to themselves or each other than the differences of animals. In the age of activity and of progress, when the causes of their greatness were chiefly in operation, did any one of these people explain what he was or endeavour to interpret the cause of his advancement? No—words are only used after the thing has expired. The classical age is the age preceding decay, when words come in—the symptom and the aggravation of the disease. Man can know what HE IS, only by comparison with dissimilar things. The character of a nation is universal, otherwise it would not be that of the nation, and being universal it cannot be observed. It is not the Englishman who can describe or understand the Englishman or the Russian. He must be a Russian as well as an Englishman before he can know anything of either. But that which pertains to his own duties requires from the honest man no reasoning on human

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character, he has only to understand the business in which *his own people is engaged,* and this every man does who can distinguish right from wrong.* Then has he the key, and understanding affairs he can understand the actors. Whoever then indulges in vague speculations regarding character, where he has to deal with matters of justice, is no more a citizen than a man designating a mistake of figures a concomitant of clerk-hood, a merchant. A nation can recover only by curing itself of GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. Remove them and then of necessity each man applies himself to facts. Then comes knowledge,† then affection for the commonwealth, because its concerns are understood, and the inducements to labour both because of light and love.

Past times exhibit (and even the present are not without examples‡) what great things small strength can do in a just cause, and how power is unavailing to effect the smallest purposes, when it is opposed by upright and able men. Individuals may fail when they deserve to succeed, and suffer when they are blameless; but nations ever meet with their deserts. For a great number of men congregated together so as to constitute a nation, no human strength can put down, if they are worthy, and however great they may be, no power of theirs can long sustain them, if they are not.

* See the first dialogue of Socrates with Alcibiades, where the science of government and the knowledge of justice are shown to be one and the same thing.

† The centralization of power within—secrecy in respect to the great concerns of every nation called diplomatic;—the multiplication of internal laws,—the overthrow of all law in international conduct, have extinguished knowledge, and therefore integrity. Thence the habit of speaking and writing on subjects not understood.

‡ *E. g.* Circassia, Serbia.

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But I do not say worthy in an absolute sense. Nations have long flourished in injustice, but then they have possessed capacity. In their capacity they have been greater, or in their injustice they have been less, than their competitors. Who would suppose that a foolish man, because he was honest would succeed? But there is no integrity where there is not capacity. The upright man will qualify himself for his duties.

It was said to Phocion, "How can justice build up states, since Athens is a great state and has been often unjust?" Phocion replied, "If those against whom Athens had to struggle were still less just than she, is not the greatness of Athens the best of testimonies to the value of justice?"

It seems strange to have to tell things so simple as discoveries on which depends the safety of a country; but truth is always simple, and has no value in itself.

Supposing a great delinquent brought to the bar of justice, charged with breaking the law and betraying the state, would the defence be admitted that his acts were but the signs of old age in the community? But a nation that has admitted such a fallacy *into its common speech* will never have the opportunity of observing the absurdity of its own propositions as reduced to practice because it never will call a great criminal to account. But, indeed, crime against such a state can no longer be perpetrated.

The picture of declining ages has been drawn by master hands. Their words ought to have for us who see the end an authority which they could not have with their contemporaries. These great metaphysicians referred to no ideal causes, they go home to the *character* of their fellow-citizens. "You," each of you

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"do so and so,"—"You Romans!" "you Athenians shame the name of your fathers." "*You* are not just,"—"*you* respect not what is lawful,"—"*you* are attached to your factions and not to your country,"—"*you* have lost knowledge of affairs."—"The true names of things." The men who so spoke were a Tacitus, or a Demosthenes, a Cato, or a Thucydides. Base and degenerate as were the Athenians and the Romans, still they felt that the words did apply to themselves, and never dreamt of diverting reproach on an abstraction. They neither put the crime of some, nor the sin of all, upon the name that belonged to a faction, or of an entity applicable to any and every spot of the universe,—"civilization," "progress," "reform," or the like. Therefore these words did find entrance into the hearts of some, and did retard the downward course of events and morals.

But the modern will say, "Nowadays we are more advanced: they narrowed their sympathies to the spot—we extend them to the human race; they were vindictive and blood-thirsty—we are benevolent and unsuspicious. If we efface the individual it is to obtain the unity of the State. If we lose sight of the part, we absorb it in the personification of the whole." Yes, you do make progress, you advance in knowledge, leaving wisdom behind. If your fathers shed blood, they did it with a motive. You perpetrate the same acts on the objects of your enlarged sympathies whilst ignorant of what you do. In your Freedom you have forgotten Law; in your Civilization, Patriotism, Justice, Integrity and Conscience. In your Factions you have lost the men.

The civilization of the Modern European, and the Christianity of the Modern Briton, are dispensing charters to sanction acts which they would execrate

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if committed by Infidels and Barbarians. Each individual denies his share of guilt without holding by law responsible those to whom he has confided power for the purpose of preventing, not committing crimes, and all this not for profit's sake, nor for a purpose, but because bewildered in a chaos of hazy speech.*

* The following is a specimen of the replies made to the earnest appeals of the few in England who sorrow and labour.

"You are fortunate in having the inclination and the time to devote to political matters, but I am so situated that my own immediate affairs engross all my time and attention. I am not disposed to take any interest in politics, for the course pursued by the public men in this country during the last few years, has been so void of principle (being disposed to sacrifice every thing to party), that I have become utterly disgusted, and have come to the conclusion that it is almost impossible to be a public man and an honest man. I am willing, therefore, to let things take their course, without any interference on my part."

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III.—THE CONNECTION OF RELIGION AND POLITICS.

THE words "Religion" and "Politics," call up ideas most dissimilar; the one removed from temporal errors and passions, the other from plain and simple dealing. Is this antagonism inherent in the subject, or is it created by the term? A man to *know what he means* by either word, must dive into himself for the impressions there treasured up, and of the origin of which he is no longer able to render account. He does not, however, take this course, nor does he even think on the subject, consequently these images are supposed to be not in us, but without us. We may put on religion as a vesture, we may take up politics as an avocation, they are to be at our choice accepted or rejected. Should these images not be correct,—should these two justly understood, not be without us but *within us*,—should they not be dissimilar and opposed, but similar and necessary to each other,—then shall we have made *our* religion and *our* politics false. Yet this mistake will not have resulted from failure in a conscious effort, but from traditions which we have received before we used our reason, and the origin of which is lost to us in the dark antiquity of our childhood. It is our part therefore to ascend beyond the period of our individual existence, if we would know ourselves.

We have taken fresh words from other and ancient tongues. Borrowing of words is incurring the most serious of all liabilities. A word representing a

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tangible object or a conclusion arrived at by a scientific process, may be borrowed without hazard, not so those that have no antecedently known representative. There are no new discoveries to be made in morals, so is there no occasion for new terms. When a nation borrows such a term it only confuses its own idea, for it cannot take the thought which it represented in the other language. The new term must be applied in the first instance viciously, to mask fallacies or misdeeds, that could not be presented in plain terms. Take a recent instance "Expediency." In the Latin it conveys no such meaning as that we have attached to it, indeed there is no such word. Its power in English is that of a common denominator for right and wrong. It could not have been invented by those who sought to assist the right, and must owe its origin to the purpose of maintaining the wrong. It has facilitated public immorality, and degrading the English tongue has degraded every Englishman. It is a word that would be abhorrent to a virtuous people, and nonsensical either to a simple or a logical one. The form is no more Latin than the sense is Roman, yet this accumulation of solecism and error, only serves to render it the more available.

Thus it is that in course of time, whatever corruption drops into the stream of language flows ever after therein. A fraud practised, a forgery committed by one man in one age remains thereafter, and for ever after, a constituent part of each human being born into that tongne.

But it may be objected, that a term may be used in one sense in one age, and in another sense in another, and that it may be used in the qualified sense without injury, because without design or

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fraud. The original falsification *did not injure* the man who was guilty of it—*it injured those who did not detect it.* It is not the Minister of State who speaks of "expediency" that is deceived, but it is the Nation who endures it. The fraud was the instrument only of the man who deceived, it is the cause of stumbling to the nation that is deceived. The change of the sense of a borrowed term, or the introduction of a false term was, whenever made, and by whoever made,—a perversion of the truth. There must have been a man who did this, and a period when it occurred; that lie will not be attenuated in space, or absorbed by number, but it will be reproduced from generation to generation, and will live anew in each man; it will flow with time, and expand with multitude.

Religion and Politics are words of this class: they do not represent things visible to the eye, and therefore their value resides in the sound; which creates *in the child* the idea to which it is applied *by the man.*

"Religion" coming to us from the Romans, we must seek first its Latin sense. We would say *the* "religion," *of Rome* was "paganism," ours is "Christianity;" their religion was a false religion, ours a true one; and in this consists the difference. This is not so; the word Religion in Latin is derived from the verb "*to bind,*" and it designates the earliest of bindings, the binding of man by his faith to the performance of those duties that in modern English language are political.

"Politics" comes from the Greeks. We would say "the politics of Greece was their form of government and their public affairs, and the politics of England is ours, and therefore the term 'politics' can be

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equally applied to England and to Greece, the difference being the difference between Athens and England." But it is not so. The word "Politics" in Greece had reference to the laws by which men were brought and then bound together. It did not represent either constitution or acts. Its root is πολις a city, thence πολιτεια or the state, thence τα πολιτικα, which we translate "politics," that is the knowledge of what it was proper and fitting that the state should be.* It was the knowledge of justice, to enforce which, law was ordained. Politics was the highest of terms, the justest of things. It represented whatever was excellent in the state, whatever was dutiful for the men. It stood above the law, giving to law both its essence and its power.

To the Roman "Religion" presented not worship, not faith, not abstractedly duty to his fellow-men in private concerns and in individual dealings, but with all these it signified the binding of man to do justice to and by the State, as a member of the community, and thus was it that to a religious body the power of peace and war was confided.†

In Greek the word "Politics," in Latin the word "Religion," was equivalent to wisdom and justice. In the Latin or the Greek language it would have

* Laws among the Greeks were "regulations."—νομοι.

† It is singular that the Romans, who, in the origin constituted themselves for warlike purposes, with a determination and a science which has never presided in the same degree at the formation of any other state, should at the same time have imposed upon themselves restraints in the exercise of that power to which there is no parallel instance. The great Legislators of the East have indeed imposed such restraints, but in Rome a band of armed men tied itself down so as to withdraw from its secular Government, not only the power of declaring war but the negotiations which might have a tendency thereto.

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been impossible to represent the meaning that is conveyed by the terms as borrowed by us—"Religion and Politics are opposed,"—nor could we in English say this, had we not borrowed and falsified foreign words. Man was by them considered a "political," as we now call him a "reasoning" being. The irreligious man was not a "politician" but a bad man. The non-political man was not a "religious" but a faithless one. There was no religion that could be adopted as a vesture, there were no politics that could be worn as a mask. Politics was the knowledge of what was right, Religion the obligation to perform it. In their verbal origin the thoughts so far from being opposed, are inseparably connected, and being separated both are destroyed. Religion is conscience, Politics duty; the first is to comprehend, the second to do our duty. Can a man understand his duties and not perform them? Can a man perform the duties that he has not understood? The things in their very nature, the terms in their grammatical value, are inseparably connected. How can they for us separately exist? When we speak of policy we exclude the obligations of justice, and with practice not just, religion can have nothing to do. Religion is fruitless faith, and policy is lawless practice.

Politics, we understand, as designating *whatever is done.* The people from whom we took the term used it to designate that which they *ought to do.* It is with us the accidents that happen; it was with them the service that had to be performed: it is with us news that is heard; it was with them the science that was taught. We have taken their word to represent our condition—the term that designated health we apply to corruption; masking from our-

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selves health on the one hand, and malady on the other. We are all sufficiently careful of our fleshly existence, and we are perfectly certain that if we breathe impure air and nourish ourselves with deleterious food, ignorance will not bring impunity; and yet we will take no care to prevent the entrance into our mental existence of breath that is corrupting, and food that is destructive. False terms, as poison, once admitted, work their way in us; our will is then no antidote. But if each man would rejoice to see Religion and Politics existing in their true sense, then it follows that we are not misled by desire to do wrong, and not naturally indisposed to what is just and dutiful. But noxious weeds have been sown, and have flourished in the richness of the abandoned mould, a harvest covers the earth which exhausting the soil, pleases the eye without supplying the wants of man. Whoever would be the husbandman of his own breast, will examine before he sows the seed. Discriminating between useful plants and weeds, he will labour with profit, in the vineyard which God has given him to till.

Religion is of three kinds, revealed, natural, and imposture.

Revealed religion teaches justice. The observance of the law, and prevention of crime and sin, are for the church a duty and therefore a character. As it is by the fruit that the tree is known, it is he only who does what is just who is a Christian, whether in his individual capacity—whether as member of a community.

Natural religion teaches in like manner that man must do his duty to his fellow-men, and it is from the supremacy of one law of right that it argues to the existence of one Creator and Ruler of the world.

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Whoever then professes natural religion, admits the obligation to do justice; and if he does not perform it, he belies the doctrine he teaches, and falsifies the argument upon which it rests.

The four great religious systems of antiquity and the East—that of Confucius, Zoroaster, Menu, and Mahomet, coincide with the requirements of revealed, and the arguments of natural religion. They impose upon their followers, not only to do justice, but to love mercy. These systems not separating religion from politics, establish in various forms spiritual and religious checks over those who are put in possession of temporal power.

Justice then, and religion, of whatever character and form, are inseparable. Religion, of whatever form or denomination, adds its authority to the instinct of justice already within every man's breast, and from which it derived its first sanction and its original form.

The world has not yet witnessed the phenomenon of a religion that did not enforce justice. Religious, as political bodies, when they become great, do unjust things, and thus the original impress is effaced, but their power has been derived from their real value and their use—not from their abuse.

Those who having cleared away the mist of terms have seen into the heart of man, and distinguished what was there first and indelibly engraven, have become lawgivers, and founders of systems and of faiths. No commandments were required until mists had gathered over and obscured the tracing of God's fingers. He was a lawgiver, who could best discern those bright lines, and he became a king when power was requisite to curb wild desires which the conscience of man himself reproved. The lawgiver,

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supported conscience by the sanction of justice, the king supporting law by the power of the state. By declaring the right when obscured by doubt, by enforcing it when assailed by violence, authority has been conquered over men, the authority raised on high reimposed the obligation to do that which was right, and this obligation became the basis of the double allegiance which they owe, temporal and spiritual. The first authority arose from domestic charities; the second from the fear of God; the third from the passions of men; the fourth from their danger or their crimes. The first was the patriarch; the second the priest; the third the judge; the fourth the king. The first kings of our race, when they occupied by conquest and settled by robbery, were war rulers, and became requisite in peace, because our modern societies did not grow from the mere increase of families. Not so those more ancient, and not less majestic personifications of regal dignity. The first kings of primeval societies were judges, and the sovereigns of the state were the high-priests of the people. As the power was one in the state, so was duty in the breast of the citizen. But when man considered it one thing to be just and another thing to be pious, or rather when he considered it not impracticable to be unjust and superstitious, then was the judge and the priest driven forth from the breast of the ruler, and the patriarch became a monarch. Then were two governments established, the one temporal the other spiritual; and at first the decrees of rulers coincided with the commandments of God,—the church, controlling the acts of those rulers, prolonged the connection of politics and religion. By the gradual growth of error, of system, growing out of error,

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Religion and Politics decayed and diverged, and the Church either losing strength as a body, or justice as a faith, became powerless or fanatic. The agreement that reigned, whilst the two authorities coincided, degenerated into dissension and conflict, or into still more fatal unanimity, by the domination of fanaticism over law, or by the subserviency of bigotry to despotism.

Such has been the history of the rise and fall of States, until the appearance of Christianity, which divides time into two epochs. The Christian religion came in the midst of a wreck, and chaos of the past, —chaos of forms not of elements, of institutions not of matter. Christianity came at once to struggle with men and princes; it entered the world suffering and combating,—suffering from power and blindness, combating with guilt and sin.

Thus from the earliest record of organic institutions, down to the time in which we live, through all fluctuation of decay and recovery, of conquest and subjugation, all men in all ages have had at once a faith and a government; and every man that is now born into the world is bound in indefeasible allegiance to the one as to the other. As there are laws of men, as there are commandments of God, visible administrators of either law or service have been raised up, because men have judged this requisite for their maintenance, interpretation, enforcement, and permanency; and they have bound themselves in obedience to these authorities. But this double allegiance which we owe, is not to the man, but for and by the law,—the law of the land to the King, and the law of God to the Church; and there is not amongst us one man who can by ignorance escape from the penalties of the infraction of the law by his rulers;

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nor is there one man that does his service to his God or his country, who in such matters is ignorant.

These two laws, and this double allegiance, coincide in the graver matters that are enjoined by them,—as for instance, in respect to theft and murder. Supposing theft and murder to be committed with impunity, all law is set at naught; and if the law is altogether broken where it is broken in one point, how much more when it is broken in the highest? these crimes are not only commissible by individuals, they are so also by communities; if we suppose the case of a community committing murder and robbery, we have the same consequences as if these were the habitual practice of each individual. A community that commits murder, and that robs in its corporate capacity, has set at naught the laws of the land and the commandments of God, it has rebelled against all things that are sacred to man—his instincts within—the bonds which unite him to his fellow-men—the laws which are in common instituted—the allegiance which he owes to his sovereign and the profession which he makes of his creed. A community composed of such men is expressly accursed by its Maker: for he is accursed who sheds his fellow's blood; and he also is accursed who removes his neighbour's landmark.

Religion and Politics are thus inseparably connected, by the fact that he who perpetrates a crime violates both laws, they are one in that they enjoin, and in what they forbid; infraction of the one cannot take place without rebellion against the other. The King that violates the Law, the people that make an unjust war, politically sins against its faith, as much as the Priest sins against his allegiance, who has not taught such sins against God are crimes against the State,

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and who does not repudiate and denounce them when committed. The Statesman who despises the obligations of religion, the Churchman who disregards the business of politics, are as guilty in the very abstinence as any crime can make them, because acts are only the symptoms; guilt is in the condition. What is commanded to each is commanded to all. It is commanded to the State as to the individual. Punishment is decreed no more against those who commit crimes than against those who instigate others to their perpetraton, be they private men or men in authority, be they subjects or princes. Vengeance is denounced against the State as a State, against the men as men; punishment temporal upon the community, spiritual and eternal upon its members.

By the language of the laws of England, as well as by its whole tenor and enactments, is identity, and not disunion, established between Religion and Politics. In the Statute of Appeals this definition occurs:—"*That part of the politic body, now usually called the English Church,*" afterwards, "*that other part* of the said body politic, called the Temporality;" and it is said that "*both their authorities and jurisdictions do conjoin together in the due administration of justice, the one to help the other.*"

We have in the original of the term Religion,—in its application among the nation when it was first used,—in the faith of Christ to which we have applied it,—in the doctrine of the church which sprung from that faith,—in the constitution of England with which that church is associated,—in the laws of the land which establish alike Church and Constitution, the clear, distinct, emphatic recognition of the connexion of religion with the duties of men.

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Turning now to the word "Politics," in the language from which it is derived,—in the thought of the people who used that tongue,—in the practice of the state, composed of those men, we have that term as the definition, not merely of the duties of man to the state, but the qualification of a reasoning being.*

Supposing the case of a nation violating their laws and yet professing to believe in their religion, would there not be a necessity to make its religion consist in abstractions, and not in duty,—their citizenship in maxims, and not in law; Would not such a people, each separately, disassociate himself from the acts of the community, profess to have nothing to do with them, and to be irresponsible? But such a man, would he not be the personification of that reprobate and lawless being, that lives an outcast without God in the world?

This condition is now realised in England.† A Roman so placed speaks as follows of the laws, of which he had learnt, from the lawlessness around, the beauty and the power:—

"There is, indeed, a true law, a right reason, congruent to nature, diffused in all, constant and eternal, which ordering, calls to duty, which forbidding, deters from fraud; which neither orders nor forbids the upright in vain, nor ordering and forbidding moves the unjust. From this law can no man be absolved, either by Senate or people. Nor have we to seek any

* The epithet "politic," was equivalent to the word as at present used "civilization;" living in a State in which there were laws instituted and obeyed, duties recognized and performed, as distinguished thereby from savage nature. Further, "reasoning" and "political" were convertible terms. Thus Aristotle—*ανθρωπος φυσει πολιτικον ζωον.*

† Referring to the Affghan war.

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expounder or interpreter of it to us. Nor is there one law of Rome, one of Athens, one now and hereafter another. But it is of all nations, and of all times,—one and eternal, as is God,—the master and ruler of all. He is the author, dispenser, and giver of this law, and whoever obeys it not, flies himself, and despises the nature of man, and in this endures the gravest of penalties, even should he escape what men esteem punishment."*

"No nation," said James Akenside, "ever suffered in its liberties at home, without having first violated the laws of justice against its neighbours." Every consideration of prudence as of honesty, requires from a people the utmost care that the government they have instituted shall not itself become, and cause them to become, the violator of the public laws of nations. When such a contingency arises, then the last appeal is to the church, and it belongs to its dignitaries to arouse guilty consciences from their slumbers. Such was wont to be the case formerly in Christian lands,—it has ceased for awhile. The knowledge of public affairs, being thus obliterated in each nation, no restraint remains over the aberrations of one government by the sense of justice in another government of the people.† Then the refuge is indifference, or the dogma that ignorance shields

* Cicero De Republica fragment.

† "History," says De Maistre, "has been for three centuries a grand conspiracy against truth." The historian of the 'Revolutions of Europe,' puts it more intelligibly when he says, that "the disregard of nations for law and justice, during the last hundred years, has made History more difficult." But then, on the other hand, the organ of the late administration of England (the Edinburgh Review) consoles the world with the assurance, that "the folly and wickedness of war is now recognized by all civilized communities!"

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from responsibility. The government becoming base, the church becomes submissive.

Let us take an instance, to show that these are no vain images or fears. What has England, a *Christian* people, done in China? There was neither that which made war legal, nor was there that which made it necessary and just; nor were there steps taken to obtain reparation; nor were the prescribed forms of the law obeyed in England; yet was blood shed and land-marks removed. This Christian people robbed and murdered. This people had a Church. That Church is very powerful. To its members and representatives, and to its head, place and station are given,—the very highest. Prelates sit in the great council of the realm, in the privy council of the monarch, and to the chief of that Church the Sovereign makes oath to maintain the statutes of the realm. Yet from that Church no withering denunciation has come forth, no excommunication is hurled. As citizens, as chiefs, as prelates, as barons, as members of the privy council, they are silent and consenting. From no man, teaching the religion of Christ, in England, has there proceeded, by act or word, either an attempt to prevent, or an attempt to punish. What then is the Church of England? Is it the Church of Christ? Yet it is for these purposes it is instituted—that these preachers are ordained—that its authority is possessed—and that its wealth is conferred. But whilst this Church renounces the commonest duties of Christian, it ceases not thereby to be fanatic. When, to teachers of that Church, their guilt has been shown, they have answered as follows:—"We sift not the inscrutable decrees of Providence; no doubt what is suffered is for a wise purpose, and these events have opened a door for the

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Gospel in China."* Having separated religion from Politics, they knew not what human acts were. To them, the crimes of salaried assassins from Christian England, are the acts of the God of justice and of mercy. and the guilty men who sent them forth are the ministers of *Providence.* The abhorrence for the name of Christian is to them the preparing of the way for a religion, of charity, and faith.

"The old English could express most aptly all the conceits of the mind in their own tongue, without borrowing from any; as, for example, the holy service of God, which the Latins called *Religion,* because it kindled the minds of men together, and most people of Europe have borrowed the same from them, they called most significantly *can-fastness,* as the one and only assurance and fast anchor-hold of our souls' health."—*Camden.*

* So the politicians in their walk cry out, "We will do evil that good may come."

"We do not mean to justify," says the *Times,* speaking of Scinde, "those aggressions, because of the success that has attended them; but at the same time we do not hesitate to affirm, that *as things have turned out,* it is the duty of the Indian Government to make the best use they can of this new acquisition." Since you have robbed, it is your *duty* to lay out the money profitably! It is for this we shall hold you responsible! Such are the politics of the *wise* —such the religion of the *pious!*

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IV.—WAR AND PEACE.

Sir H. Brydges concludes his pamphlet on the Affghan war with these words:—"In my humble station I agree with the great Roman orator—"Iniquissimam Pacem justissimo bello antefero."

He had shown that just, beneficial, and prepotent peace had been exchanged for covetous, cowardly, mismanaged, and injurious war: and quotes, in support of his position, words, which would imply it the authority of the writer that gave weight to idle words? Was that authority increased by that of an English statesman of the last generation, who specially loved the phrase, and found it of use in the House of Commons in the labour of his vocation?—a vocation the reverse of that of Sir H. Brydges, who seeks to restore a nation, not to strengthen a party.

"They (events in France) have convinced me," said Mr. Fox, in 1794, "of the truth of an observation of Cicero—one of the most common which is early taught in our grammars, but from which, when a boy, my heart revolted—'*Iniquissimam pacem,*' &c. In the ardour natural to youth I thought this a most horrid and degrading sentiment. When I came to maturer years I thought the sentiment at least doubtful; but I am now ready to confess that the *events of the French Revolution* have made the wisdom justice *in the war,* and iniquity *in the peace.* Was of the sentiment clear and manifest to my mind."

The maxim here is quoted not as applying to *War* but to *Revolution!*

"The more I think," says Mr. Fox on another

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occasion, "the more convinced am I of the philosophy of the maxim '*Iniquissimam pacem*, &c.' This appears to me to be one of the wisest sayings of that wise man; and it expresses my opinion upon the point of *prudence* in the present case."

Here the maxim is quoted, not as applying to *war*, but to an *internal measure!*

Mr. Fox was combatting the Treason and Sedition Bill to prevent meetings without the sanction of a magistrate, and to empower him to dissolve such meeting at his free will. Fox calls this bill a conspiracy against the people, and the repeal of the Bill of Rights. He will not condemn the people if they rebel against it, but he will not join them. He denounces the bill as against law, and as the destruction of it, yet he does not resist it on the law and by the law. He admits lawless law, and sanctions revolt against law, but has not the courage to dare what he has the sophistry to commend. To such a man such a sentence was indeed a treasure.

The "sentiment" was to Fox first "*horrid*," then "*doubtful*," then "*wise*." He marks three periods —youth, adolescence, and manhood: sophistry being detestable to the first, indifferent to the second, and pleasing to the last. His words mark at once the difference between the integrity and elevation of the youth, and the degradation of the man in a corrupt age, and the contrast that had been effected in England in the period intervening between his boyhood and manhood.

But let us ascend from the quoter to the quoted—from the change of England during the lifetime of Fox, to the change of Rome during the lifetime of Cicero. It is indeed astounding, and it may appear incredible, that a sentiment such as that quoted,—

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one so elaborately vile, could have proceeded from lips that have been almost sanctified by the glowing strains which they have poured forth, painting the duties of man in their beauty, describing the misery of man, and the ruin of states in their neglect. But Cicero lived in the crepuscal of freedom—in the twilight of Rome; his glory comes as that of a planet, not from the excess of its light, but from the darkness through which it lightens. The bright surface of his powerful mind caught the images of surrounding things, as a cloud hanging on the horizon, gilded on one side by the last rays of the descending sun, and shaded on the other by the gloom of advancing night: so have his pages reflected downwards through ages, at once the light of departing freedom, and the darkness where it had ceased to shine. Side by side, distinguished only by a slight inflection, are presented to our admiration and contempt, thoughts that ennoble—fallacies that betray.

The poison of such a sentence is so subtle that it is necessary to render the exposure complete. It must be shown that it is not for such thoughts that Cicero is *Cicero* to us,—that it is not in such doctrines that Rome is *Rome* to us; his conduct in his better days, his words in his nobler works, not only coincide not with the doctrine of this quotation, but are to it the most perfect antithesis that the mind can conceive.

The great event of Cicero's life was the quelling of the conspiracy of Catiline: then he was ready to risk all—not his life only, but *that* of the community, to save its dignity and honour. In the words of Sallust, he might be imagined saying "*Malo periculosam libertatem quam tutam servitutem.*"

Cicero, in describing the Roman state, has laid down as an incontrovertible law of its existence, that

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"the republic could not be governed, save by the highest justice." To which nothing can be more opposed than an iniquitous peace.

Such, as a citizen, was the conduct of Cicero—such, as a lawyer, his doctrines of the constitution of Rome. But Cicero was a philosopher—he was the follower of a school, which above all other things required the practising and the enforcing of justice. It made all virtue in men depend thereon, and indeed placed the character of *man* in the sense of justice.

The Academicians held justice to reside in the mean, less or more than justice being equally unjust; they held injustice to consist not less in enduring than in committing it. It is not here understood, that the man who endures evil which it is not in his power to resist is thereby rendered guilty. The weight of chains afflict a man, but do not enslave him. There is no slavery but error; and the man is the slave of himself. The Academicians held the suffering of injustice to be baser than its perpetration. The latter case supposes some passion that obscures and prostrates, for a time, the reason; in the former suffering and disgrace accompany the wrong to arouse the faculties and to clear the sight. In the eyes of the masters of Cicero, as in the eyes of every man who has possessed character or deserved to have authority, an iniquitous peace was not better than a just war, but on the contrary *more base than an unjust one.*

War is an accident, peace a condition. War is produced by crime—which laws are established to prevent and punish; when they live in the breast of a people, resists criminal designs on the part of other nations. If it were not so, might would be right, and the round world one fold of slaves.

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When a war takes place crime is indeed attempted, but also it is—*resisted.**

Peace is our ordinary existence, but an iniquitous peace is an iniquitous condition, it is the abandonment of all that just wars protect or unjust wars assail. It is the prostration of the innocent—it is the triumph of the wicked; of the first without a struggle, of the second without an impediment. If peace be vitiated, what can there be further to preserve? what further to vitiate? It is iniquitous peace that brings unjnst wars, and that causes them to triumph. Why was it ever said, "he is trebly armed whose cause is just." To teach, that iniquitous peace is endurable or desirable, to invest in epigrammatic form, and to present in authoritative garb, the atrocious dogma, is to spread over the world, and through all times, the poison that killed Roman freedom. The fall of Rome and the desolation of the world are explained by this very sentence: the simple uprightness of the heart suffices to teach that the people amongst whom it could be uttered, must perish. If we would think of Romans as they ought to be thought of, and so that the thought of them shall be useful to ourselves, let it be in those majestic words—

"FIAT JUSTITIA RUAT CŒLUM."

* The blood shed in Affghanistan and in Algeria, proves virtues as well as crimes, and it raises the character of man to see such constancy, such daring, such fidelity, against such odds. Such deeds are a consolation much required in the times in which we are, and the people amongst whom we live. Lord Ellenborough and General Bugeaud, if the Scindians or the Arabs were classical scholars, would find "iniquissimam pacem justissimo bello antefero," a useful maxim; that is to say, if it was conquest for their country that they unjustly desired, and not excitement and distinction for themselves.

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V.—FREEDOM AND CONSTITUTION.

If one word more than another could be esteemed free from error and incentive to good, it would be "Government." By Government we secure repose from trouble, protection against danger, punishment for guilt, and the enjoyment of all physical* and mental fruits; lest these should bring sloth, cowardice, and decay, care is also required at our hands, discipline imposed upon us, and anxiety; so qualifying us, by the necessity of protecting it, for the enjoyment of the happiness that we possess.

We give to this condition an abstract name, and from that moment the condition itself depends upon the name. England may be said to exist in the word Freedom.†

The clearness of thought is contingent both upon the regularity of the order and upon the accuracy of the terms of a language. Freedom is a term involving the confusion of both. It is so pre-eminently mystical, anomalous, incoherent, and contradictory, that the brain is rendered dizzy by attempting to fire it. Alas! for the nations that use it, thinking it has sense.

* The beggar in Greece asks alms thus—*κηβερνησε μου*—govern me!

† "The *best* (meaning the most successful) verbal fallacies are those which consist not in the ambiguity of a single word, but in the ambiguous syntaxis of many put together."—*Hamilton's Maxims of Parliamentary Logic.*

Here is implied the use, or rather misuse, of a language—not the peculiarity of syntax of one language as contrasted with another.

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This word is formed of an adjective and a suffix. There is no other word so formed in the English tongue. The adjective implies a negative and the suffix a condition. We say "free from sorrow, pain, guilt, death, contagion," implying the absence of undesirable things. But we do not say "free from joy, virtue, health," and yet out of this negative adjective applicable only to what is objectionable, we create a positive substantive to represent all that is desirable. No wonder then, that there should be failure in operations undertaken in practice subordinate to such process of thought.

If we were to project for ourselves the transformation of an adjective into the substantive the operation would be abandoned as too wonderful to be conceived. Yet the achievement is performed by our lips a thousand times a day. The man who has gone as a boy to school has been told and absolutely believes that he has a process for doing this, which process he calls abstraction, consisting in the taking out of many dissimilar things the part that is common to them all, which part then becomes an offence and subsists independently of subject matter, he knowing all the while that this is impossible, but he nevertheless making that impossibility the nominatives of all his verbs and the pivots of every sentence. Henceforward he steps out of existence into an ideal world, and expends the life given him to observe and act, on a false one of his own creation, consisting of entities, pseudo-substantives, which he dresses and works like marionettes on a pigmy stage, meanwhile worshipping his own ingenuities, as if they were, as indeed they are, the rulers of his destiny.

If any one is startled at the results, he contents himself with reviling the faculties which God has

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given him, and speech itself, the chief instrument supplied for his use.*

Almost all such words are derived from the dead languages: the cheat would have been too glaring in our native tongue. Let any one fix his thought upon a modern sentence and search for its contents, he will find that he can discard every metaphysical substantive of Greek or Latin origin, without loss of any idea it contains. Such a process would leave, however, few modern sentences extant. But alas! to us a language is commendable in its richness, not in its simplicity, in its volume, not in its power. The glossy surface of the turbid and sluggish stream is dearer to us than the purity of the highland source; we treat so differently the sight of the body and the mind, that we labour to obtain for the one, what we should labour to cure in the other. "But the Greeks and Romans—had they not the self-same images?" What! is there such a thing as "populatio" in Latin—is there "educatio," or "deitas," or "qualitas"? †—No, "to people"—"to teach"

* "If any one shall well consider the errors and obscurity, the mistakes and confusion, that are spread in the world by an ill use of words, he will find some reason to doubt whether *language*, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of *knowledge* (!) among mankind."—*Locke.*

"When we ask ourselves what we mean by these terms, 'Constitution, Principle, &c.' we shall at once be brought to see how much we are swayed by mere words. Not one of them designate anything that has a real existence, except as a sound; still we are ready to sacrifice our lives for them at a moment's notice. Indeed a consideration of this question will lead to the belief, that language itself is a main part of what we call by the name of mind. *Without language* not one of these conceptions would have an existence; nor could one drop of the torrents of blood that have flowed from such causes have been shed."—*Sir Graves Haughton.*

† *Quality* is itself perhaps the most singular illustration of this ·nt creativeness, coming from a word used in asking a question,

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"to bring up" was a *verb;* there were, therefore, no theories of peopling, and no doctrines about bringing up. "But what is all the philosophy of the ancients, if not abstraction, as virtue, truth, &c.?" They spoke of "the beautiful," "the good," "the true"—or that which was beautiful—good—true. They used the advantage given them over us in the structure of their language—the neuter of the adjective, καλον, αληθειον. "But did they not say also αληθεια?" Yes, but that was a *goddess!* There was no ambiguity—it *was* personation, and it is as idolaters that we despise them! The idolatry of the ancients was an aid to the imagination—ours, fetters to the mind. "There is no *goddess,*" says Polybius, "equal in nature to truth;" he is conscious of what he says, he uses his words—they do not use him. Idolatry indeed! Their night was clearer than our day.

If the process of abstraction can give us "goodness" or "badness,"—to make a substantive out of free you must abstract something from *nothing*. You have already "nothingness:" with which "*freedom*" must be synonymous—since free and nothing are so. But perhaps there may be some latent sense in the adjoined letters d, o, m. These are suffixes implying an inherent condition, as the adjective subjoined expresses a predicated quality; *e. g.* "king*dom,*" "prince*dom,*" "pope*dom,*" &c. In *German,* "Fürsten*thum,*" "König*thum,*" &c.; these express the state of prince, the power of king, and so on.* *Dom* is

—*Qualis,* it would be in English—whatism, whatishness. In Latin it was invented by Cicero to render the Greek ποιοτης.

* "In Sanscrit abstract terms are formed by the terminations TWAM, TA, YA and ZIS. From the first comes the English *dom* as in *freedom.* From Ta has sprung the Greek της and Latin *tas. Tis* is evidently corrupted into the Greek σις as is σασις, ποίησις. Not one of these terminations can be traced to any word having a

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joined to a substantive, never to an adjective. It is added to those substantives only which represent real and known things, not to those which represent abstractions. It could not be connected with *happiness, goodness, virtue, truth;* you could not say *excessiveness-dom,* or *sensitiveness-dom,* any more than you could add it to the mere adjective, and make it *excessive-dom* or *sensitive-dom;* yet excessive and sensitive are words of the same character and quality as free, and if *dom* added to them would constitute a non-sense, so must it in the other case. Thus, "freedom," in grammar, is a solecism,—in etymology, a contradiction; no wonder that it should prove a stumbling-block in sense and a failure in practice.

"The king, and the kingdom," was the earliest designation of the British state,* as that of "the emperor, and the empire," was of Germany. Herein is conveyed the dignity of the head, and the functions of the body. The king, representing the state, could do nothing save for it and by it. Each of the communities out of which the state was composed (not into which it was *divided*) did deliberate, and must have assented, before a measure could be executed; and the whole of that weight of thought and will was placed against the infraction of rule in the conduct of business, as much as against the infraction of law in the exercise of violence. This was the *kingdom;* and the difference of that word then, with what it stands for now—being but a term of geo-

meaning. In the Arabic abstract terms are formed by adding IYAT, as KABILIYAT *ability*, from KABIL *able*. Yet we are *certain*, from the genius of the language, that this termination never was significant, but purely artificial."—*Prodromus, App. No.* 1.

* The term *Monarch* is an instance of the falsehood of foreign forms.

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graphy—is shown in this, that where so used in an old writer, it has to be *translated* into our tongue.* And how changed on the other hand the "king," when we speak of him as—an *estate of the realm!*

There was formerly a word intervening between king and kingdom, "*kingship;*" and as "there was no distinction in law between kingship and the exercise of it," so was there in the common judgment no doubt, "that to take away the *exercise* is to take away the *thing*." † It would have been impossible for the common sense even of that period to have conceived subjects, not in open rebellion, but professing redundant loyalty, barring a king from the exercise of his functions; or a king, not in durance, submitting to the deprivation. No wonder that the words of the two ages should no longer coincide, where the change has become such that our forefathers could not believe our state possible, and we are powerless to comprehend theirs.

Freedom, having a real and ancient value, we cannot, as in the case of words derived from Greek and Latin, expose its present perversion through these tongues. This at least we can do: show that it is superfluous for "freedom from tyranny," "freedom from danger," is just as much, and no more than "free from tyranny," "not in danger."

A modern writer says, "It is liberty that is ancient—it is despotism that is new." Whilst what they mean by freedom did exist—it had no name. Liberty came after slavery, and is known only in

* "Those words of Grotius, 'Rex and Regnum,' I should translate into English, 'King and *Parliament*.'"—*Pleadings in Campbell v. Hall; Loft's Reports.*

† Polfexen in conferences of the Convention Parliament on the vacancy of the throne, 1688.

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contrast as health is by disease. After subjugation by a domestic or a foreign tyrant, men sought to free themselves. Having done so, the word had no longer sense. A child under tutelage may look to become free, but when it is emancipated it is not then said to be possessed of freedom; the fact of the freedom achieved is not substituted in lieu of duties. If however, instead of saying the child has arrived at man's estate, we said he has arrived at the state of freedom, we should, as in the case of the community, destroy the sense of duty. From the moment he ceases to have a master to control him and a parent to correct him, the child has to cultivate his own reason, to protect himself against the new master under whom he may fall—and that is himself—through the weakness of his judgment, or the passions of his temperament. It is not, therefore, into a state of freedom that he passes, but, on the contrary, into one of care. If he succeeds, he is not said to be possessed of freedom from error, any more than of freedom from tutelage, but simply to be a good citizen. There being no confusion in the terms, there is integrity in the practice.

In the origin, a child is nothing, it is moulded into the form of those around it: not so nations; in their origin, they possess those characters which give them a distinct name and a subsequent history. There are living nations, specimens of that original condition.*

* Montaigne regrets that the Red Indians were not discovered or made known to the European world, while there yet lived men capable of appreciating such a fact as that of a people existing without laws, and points to them as a reality, beyond the dreams of Plato.

Of the Circassians, future times may have to speak, when they contemplate the real worth displayed in their solitary stand in arms, and in mind, against the power whose weapons or whose arts have

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They have no laws, nor even a written language! Laws have only sprung where differences have arisen, and these have arisen among nations as among individuals, by the misuse of terms. Such races ascend to a period and represent the condition of communities, anterior to laws, nor can you say of them that they had a founder; there might arise amongst them some one who by his military prowess and capacity might save his countrymen from danger, or who by his art and dexterity might frustrate the designs of neighbours; he might thereby concentrate power in himself, or make one spot predominant over the rest, but he will not have formed his community, he will be exactly like the rest, only he will have been the first to have commenced their perversion.

The machinery of government so constructed becomes active and aggressive, the other portion endures—it may dislike, but not sufficiently to prevent. The courage or clear-sightedness of the fathers is impaired, the children commence where the parents left off; in each successive generation there is less sense of injury and wrong in change, and less strength and spirit to resist it; a nation falls into an unhappy condition, which is described as the slavery which it *endures*.*

But while the sins of the people, during this first period, have been those of endurance, of an opposite character are those of its rulers—and in this perhaps the people are not the less guilty. Concurrence on the part of the sufferers is more heinous than tyranny

triumphed over and laid prostrate all other eminence, whether of power or intelligence.

* "As the blindness of mankind has caused their slavery—in return their state of slavery is made a pretence for confirming their state of blindness."—*Burke.*

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on the part of the despot, or his instruments; for his acts are of his will, and for his benefit, and they are consciously committed. He is exposed to vengeance from others, to remorse and repentance in himself; they endure only when *they know not their rights,*—that is, when they have lost the sense of right and wrong. When at length a people arouses itself, it is not because it abhors wrong,* but because it can no longer endure it. They rise in passion, and pass to the possession of power more dangerous than slavery. Left a second time to themselves, will they revert to the social structure which had sprung from their early thoughts, and which had empowered them to live well during many generations? No! in the past they only see the nearest point—the ruin, not the edifice. They will only seek to avenge, to change the government, or to expel the prince. Having associated wrong with weakness, now they confound freedom with power. No wonder that there should be great contention in respect to the designation of their condition.

Since the power of monarchs has ceased to oppress the nations they have been lost in a sea of trouble, the more they have reasoned, the wider has been the field of discussion, and the further it has extended, the more intense the contention. The most approved definition of freedom is "WHERE THE PEOPLE IS GOVERNED ONLY BY THE LAWS WHICH ITSELF HAS MADE"† In other words, that the people are at liberty

* "All governments are founded in truth and justice, and the founders of them are generally honest men; by length of time and corruption, men come to look upon those frauds *as necessary* to government, which their fathers abhorred as destructive of it."—*Lyttelton.*

† ALGERNON SYDNEY;—yet the same writer thus speaks of England's free or representative will: "In all preceding ages, par-

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to do just what they like; *Power* is put for freedom while *will* is put for right.

Power and will are to each man what he himself is. That a man should be able to do what he pleases, may be the greatest of happiness, or the last of curses. A benefactor of and an outcast from the human race, must equally have been able to do what he pleased, before the one could be venerated for his wisdom, or the other detested for his crimes.

Resolve *Power*—that knot of fallacies, into its verb *potere* "to be able"—and how simple does it become? Then indeed it is equivalent to those maxims which are held to govern its operation. "The power of the King is to do justice."—"Rex nil aliud est quam lex agens." "The Royal prerogative is nothing else save the extra judicial exertion of the law for the benefit of the subject." "Rex non potest injuriam facere." "Actus legis nemini facit injuriam." "No wrong without a remedy." "Quod Rex contra leges jubet pro injussu reputabitur."

According to these legal definitions, no man has power to do what he has not the *right* to do. What the king has a right to do, that only *can he do*, and what it is his duty to do, that *must he do*. Such is the clear-sightedness of a nation that uses *verbs*.

Thus does the word *freedom*, like all the other

liaments have been the pillars of our liberty, the sure defenders of the oppressed. They, who formerly could bridle kings, and keep the balance equal between them and the people are now become the instruments of our oppressions."

At the time the struggle was going on between the "court faction" and "the country," a successful parliamentary definition was the following:—"My notion of free Englishmen is this, that they are ruled by laws of their own making, and tried by men of the same condition with them."—*Sir Francis Winnington on the Proceedings against C. J. Sir William Scroggs*, 1680.

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fallacious terms, include a contradiction; the original sense of *right* being interlaced and commingled with that of *might*. Frenzy and presumption—the gratification of the unbridled will of millions—is cloaked under a dutiful respect for the laws of God and the feelings of men.

But why this definition? Every nation is ruled by itself. "Such as the people are, so will its rulers be." "The folly of a people is represented in the injustice of its prince." The question then arises, what laws? That not answered, nothing is said. The definers were those who had begun to think about forms of government, and the quality of the law was to them nothing—they only considered *its source*.

The will of the people is exerted, only after it has been driven to desperation by bad laws, and is therefore unfit to make good ones. Where the government is well conducted, where the ten commandments are obeyed, the people is free, although it has not made the laws.*

Had to them law meant justice, they would have said "a free people is an upright people;" therefore law means something distinct from justice, and if so opposed to it.

It is this definition that has been the theme for two hundred years of disputation, and the pivot of revolution. Every devoted effort of ingenious capacity, to relieve the sufferings or arrest the guilt of their fellow men, has been so seduced into the augmentation of the wrong, justifying the counter proposition,

* "Oh! that I could see in men that oppose tyranny in the state, a disdain of the tyranny of low passions in themselves. I cannot reconcile myself to the idea of an immoral patriot, or to that separation of private from public virtue, which some men think to be possible."—*Dr. Price, Revolution Sermon.*

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which made right whatever *is*, and reared against the phantom of the *sovereignty of the people*, the cognate, phantom of the *right divine of kings*.

A people make its laws, as well might you say that its language is made by it! Whence are laws, except in language, their strength are in terms, whether written or unwritten. If no nation has made its tongue, or constructed its grammar, how shall it have made that essence of its being by which it judges and acts—the consciousness of right and wrong? If so then a people makes itself. Law, if lawful—is just and true; truth is of God; our share in laws is the guiltiness that makes law needful, or the craft that perverts law to cover guilt.

Let us suppose a people "free" from those evils which have prompted in us political speculation; for instance from monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, church, court, church rates, poor rates, customs, excise, passports, public debt, currency laws, standing armies—from all pressure that enervates, all intricacy that confounds, and where the management of the community is plain, simple, intelligible, and business like:—can you suppose it possible that such a people questioned as to the origin of their well-being would answer, "because we are governed only by the laws we ourselves have made"? They would not understand what you meant by the question. But they would understand what you do not, that to attempt to impose on them new laws was a violence and a wrong, even as our ancestors exclaimed "*Nolumus leges Angliæ mutare.*" Wherever laws are good, men have sense enough to desire to keep them. Longevity lies in the immutability of law.

The fundamental or common law of England is unwritten and established by applications alone, that

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is precedent. To this day the enactments of parliament do not receive the sanction of publication,* without which they are not laws. There never was established in England a legislating power. Our government is altogether judicial.† True, we have slipped from adjudication into legislation, and when modern legal writers are struck by the fact, they explain it according to the present ideas. Blackstone tells us that the non-publication does not invalidate acts of parliament because they *are published*, "being enacted by our representatives, every man is supposed to be present in the Legislature!"

"When I use the word LAW," I have said elsewhere, "I mean that rule of ancient justice which has been preserved in our COMMON LAW, and not the *Statutes of Parliament*. There was a time when Parliament was the servant of the laws, their expounder and enforcer; now Parliament has desecrated Law, by pretending to be its source.‡ Parliament

* There is an exception, which proves the rule, the Magna Charta: it was but a restoration and confirmation of rights.

"This was a law promulged and established to the English, with a terror and solemnity inferior only to that of the Holy Commandments of God himself to the Jews. They enacted transcripts thereof to be carefully preserved in all the cathedrals; that it should be four times a year carefully read before the people; that twice in a year the prelacy should thunder out the greater excommunication against the infringers thereof; The bishops, holding lighted candles in their hands, extinguished them and threw them on the ground, every one present crying out, "Thus let him be extinguished and stink in Hell who violates this charter." That it should be allowed as the common law by all officers of justice; that *all statute laws or judgments, in opposition thereto*, should be null and void; nay, that the very priests and confessors should frame the consciences of the people to the observance thereof."—*Case of the Bankers.*

† "The judge administers, but does not make the law."

‡ The terms "*Ordonance*," "*Statute*," "*Adjuggements*," "*Establishments;*" and the expressions, "*it is ordained*," "*it is assented*,"

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first rendered judgments, as a Court of Law, it then proceeded to *declare* the law (Edward II), then to *limit it*, and lastly to give, as Sallust remarks of the Senate of sinking Rome, "the force of law to the decisions of their own order." The Parliament in England could not enforce their decrees, but we accepted them. We gave the *title* of law to abuses which could not have prevailed if known by their proper name. This usurpation the nation continues to enforce upon itself, by speaking of the *omnipotence* of Parliament; a word which reveals not that Parliament has usurped, but that the nation has surrendered. There remains, however, upon the bench and at the bar a tradition of better things: no age has been without a witness to testify that the law is the only mistress of England, and to protest against any power in Parliament, or any binding in its statutes, beyond that which is derived from that very law that is set at nought. No man will deny that the *unwritten* and the *written* laws of England are the two systems the most opposed that can be imagined; and as all will admit that the unwritten law is the best that any nation has possessed, so must it follow that the written is the worst. This is no theoretic antagonism. These systems are bodily represented in our Government by the Judicatories and the Parliament; and now that schism and faction have destroyed even the

are not such as would have been used had Parliament been considered a lawgiver: so also the terms still in use—as "BILL" equivalent to Petition and "ACTS of Parliament." These are not even promulgated which must have been specially provided for, had they been considered as laws. The old form of enactment leaves no ambiguity (13 H. IV.) "By the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and at the request of the Commons, it is ordered and assented that, &c."

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thought of resistance to the Commons, either by the Crown or the Church, or the Peers, now that betrayal can be no more resented by its constituents, than usurpation by its superior, or its co-ordinate estates,* there remains but one only check—the law. And what is the law save the knowledge of the past—the study of their thoughts, and the adaptation of their common practice to the present times?" †

Let us but understand what government is, and then no discussion can arise. "Crimes," says Sharon Turner: "are the express objects of all human legislation, it is against them that laws are more especially made, and to repress them is the primary cause of all human government."

We have greatly departed from this simple rule. Moreover, the method and the integrity which are evinced in all matters of science or private interest are laid aside in politics. Doubt, darkness, and insecurity do not on that field prompt to efforts to escape from so alarming a condition; on the contrary, they are looked on with satisfaction and pride, and in many new questions they see "freedom of debate" and "science of government."‡

* There is the most deadening fallacy included in the word "*Commons*." It is held to be in contradistinction to noble, and therefore the lower house is held *in itself* as equivalent to an estate of the realm. The word Commons, means the Communes, as used to-day in France—that is the burghs, thus (2 H. IV, 1432) "*Besechen mekely the Communes*."—The Communes petitioned, the King answered, and then the Parliament advised and ordained.

† Wealth and Want, or Pauperism and its Cure. p. 91.

‡ "The wisdom of the ancients, as to the government of life, was no more than certain precepts, what to do, and what not; and men were much better in that simplicity; for as they came to be more learned, they grew less careful of being good. That plain and open virtue is now turned into a dark and intricate science; and we are right to dispute rather than to live."—*Seneca.*

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"No Rulers," says Judge Story, "on earth are called to a more difficult and delicate task than our own. In the interpretation of constitutional questions alone a vast field is open for discussion and argument. The text, indeed, is singularly brief and expressive; but that very brevity becomes of itself a source of obscurity, and that very expressiveness, while it gives prominence to the leading objects, leaves an ample space of debateable ground upon which the champions of all opinions may contend with alternate victory and defeat. *Nay, the very habits of free inquiry, to which all our institutions tend, conduct us,* if they do not urge us, to a perpetual renewal of the contest; so that many minds are unwilling to admit any thing to be settled, and the text remains with them a doubtful oracle, speaking with a double meaning, and open to glosses of the most contradictory character. How much sobriety of judgment, solid learning, historical research, and political sagacity are required for such critical inquiries?"

This brings the simplicity of the source into contrast with the confusion of later stages, only to declare simplicity incomprehensible and impossible. "The very habits of free inquiry, to which all our institutions tend, conduct us to a perpetual renewal" of—idle differences! In this sentence, there is intended to be conveyed the highest commendation of the institutions which tend to and promote this "free inquiry;" how can institutions be excellent of which the result is the perpetual renewal of contest, and which require unattainable conditions for the conduct of this complicated machinery? Nor is it two or three men selected from the whole nation, but every American citizen who must possess

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all this knowledge and all these qualities, "to enable him to exercise his own rights, to protect his own interests, and sustain the just operations of public authority!" Will no one think of returning to simplicity?

Tacitus marks the twelve tables as the conclusion of just law; and *free* discussion as the period of corruption.

"Pulso Tarquinio adversum patrum factiones multa populus paravit tuendæ libertatis et firmandæ concordiæ: creatique decemviri et accitis, quæ usquam egregia, compositæ duodecem tabulæ, FINIS ÆQUI JURIS; nam secutæ *leges*, etsi aliquando in maleficos ex delicto, sæpius tamen dissensione ordinum, et apiscendi illicitos honores, aut pellendi claros viros, aliaque ob prava, per vim latæ sunt.—Jamque non modo in commune sed in singulos homines latæ *quæstiones*; et CORRUPTISSIMA REPUBLICA PLURIMÆ LEGES."

Judge Story on the contrary commends his times for this very freedom of inquiry. Did the founders of the Gothic States dread or prevent inquiry? Was there not in those days all means taken to render it certain, and conclusive, but that inquiry was into facts not speculation. Then men looked for in government only its object, namely, the prevention of crime; because they had the sense of the law. We require not the Record which the Roman Historian has left us to know that in "GREAT AFFAIRS *the whole people consulted*" and assented, just as to-day the people of Circassia or the tribes of the Indians consult and assent. On the other hand, Rome, when she took to speculating, speculated much in our fashion, only they *did* observe the contrast between their fathers and themselves. "*Our fathers*

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took care that that should be lawful which their rulers did—WE TAKE FOR LAW WHAT OUR RULERS DO."

The wise men of Greece questioned in their time on what we should call the "best form of government," confined themselves in their replies to those characters which indicated a healthy state, not a word on forms, not a proposition of any kind do they utter. For instance, "Where the laws have no superior."—Bias. "Where the people are neither extremely rich nor extremely poor."—Thales. "Where virtue is honoured and vice detested."—Anacharsis. "Where dignities are always conferred upon the virtuous."—Pittacus. "Where men fear blame more than punishment."—Cleobulus. "Where laws are more regarded than makers of speeches."—Chilo. "Where an injury done to the meanest is treated as an injury to all."—Solon. Whenever one of these characters was to be found, none could be wanting. Let us take the converse of these—"where the laws have superiors—where the people are both extremely rich and extremely poor—where virtue is not honoured nor vice despised—where dignities are not conferred because of virtue—where men fear punishment rather than blame—where leaders of faction can dispense with (or make) laws—where each man is not injured, when any fellow-citizen is so." But here we have the exact description of our own condition, that condition which we call freedom.

The true statesmen of England—the great men of Greece and Rome—from Pythagoras to Demosthenes, in the one country—from Numa and Servius to Tacitus in the other, equally ignore what we call metaphysics and politics The great founders of the wondrous systems—politico-religious—of the East, have not troubled themselves with such mat-

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ters. Definitions have been the property of the angry disputants of modern times, whether Philosophical Sages, Jacobin Clubs, Parliamentary Patriots, Royal or Republican Experimentalists. True that Machiavelli, Algernon Sydney, Spinosa, Hobbes, and Locke possessed great faculties: into great minds the canker first entered; then the canker alone was great.

From the genus we descend to the species, and among freedoms there is, "*Constitution of England.*" Grasp this, and see what is left in your hand, "state of England;" that is—England. But England, morally and politically, is her laws. Yet laws cannot be meant, for if so they would be expressed. Then there is something not law placed in lieu of law; again a phantom, again a cloud, that without body deceives by a form, and without substance covers with a shade. But it is Latin. How did the Romans use it? Did they, who knew Latin and had laws, call them the "Constitutio Romæ?" No; they spoke of *things*, and said, "S. P. Q. R." But "Constitutio" is not Latin. Where then are we, and from what abyss has this froth come up? The first words of our early enactments, as translated from the Anglo-Saxon into Latin, were "constitutum est," equivalent to "done." The thought was then—it is right, therefore be it established or constituted. Right and justice fading from sight, men grasped at the idea of firmness, and "constitutum est," became "constitution." Now, we take our stand lower; we refer to will and purpose, and say "Resolved." At a future day, when even the will is lost, we may be talking of the "*Resolution*" of England as now of her Constitution.

The word Constitution came in by a process of abstraction of a peculiar kind, one not of quality but

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of number. It was first used in the plural—"The Constitutions"—"The fundamental Constitutions,"* as if they said, The Laws—The fundamental Laws. Not, however, that the word was synonymous with law, for in that case it would not have come into use; it expressed Parliamentary enactments, in fact *statutes*, at a time when these were more valued than now, but when they were not confounded with laws. The expression "Rogare Leges," whence the term, "Rogation of the Commons," was clearly (as transferred from the Roman to our practice), a claiming or requiring the law, that is, its execution. When the terms Wittenagemote, or Mikelgethaeht, or Commune Consilium Regni, or Curia Regis, were applied to the public assembly, a weight must have attached to its acts which could not belong to them after they were designated by a word signifying *talk*. When the plural number was dropped, the word was not placed alone; it was, "The Constitution *of Government*," or "The Constitution of *English* (sic) Government,"† at one time it was distinct from *law*;‡ at another opposed to *statute*|| and that not merely in common or parliamentary talk, but in the severer language of the judicatories.

Finally in the diplomatic settlement of Europe in 1815, all turned on the word "CONSTITUTION" (of Poland), and all was thereby upset.

Right has been made law—law has become statute

* As, for instance, "The Constitutions of Clarendon."

† Protest in the Lords, on impeachment of Fitzharris, 1685.

‡ "The question was, whether not only the English laws passed to the island, *but* the English Constitution."—*Pleading in Grenada Case*, 1774.

|| "Not even an *Act of Parliament* is sufficient to warrant any proceeding contrary to the spirit of the *constitution*."—*Recorder of London in the Case of Wilkes* 1763.

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—statute, resolutions—resolutions have become constitutions—constitutions have become "the constitution;" then we speak of "the *spirit* of the constitution," "the power of the constitution;" nay, we have "a vitality," or "elasticity" of the constitution. We labour, indeed, and we mount up; we toil as culprits on a wheel, bringing down what we tread upon, and driving backwards what we move; but, unlike the culprit, our toil is not by its infamy salutary to our country, but fatal by its renown.

Another word has grown into use, and that is Common-wealth; it is a parody of Republic, but not a contrast to monarchy. Common-*wealth!* * Why, such might be a fitting title for an association of pirates.†

It was not that any man did invent, the mean and vulgar word commonwealth. It came by degrees,

* Blackstone italicises this word differently. He says:—"For the end of his coming thither is not particular, but general: not only to advantage his constituents, but the *common*-wealth."

† "Commonwealths would be eternal, if they could contain themselves within reasonable bounds, and rule with wholesome laws, piety, and justice. But how have these errors, public and private, taken their rise? In all appearance it is from hence—we have given wrong names to things, *and have allotted to vice the stamp and attributes of virtue.* We term avarice prudence and economy; we think none wise who abound not in wealth, and none honest but whom fortune favours; we call the false arts of statesmen, and the evil faith, perjury, and dissimulation, of princes, wisdom and deep policy; temerity, we style courage; ambition, we call noble thirst after glory; and they who vex, rob, and disturb the world, we dignify with the names of conquerors and heroes."—*D'Avenant on Universal Monarchy.*

This approaches, but does not reach the evil. It is but the repetition of Cato's *nos vera rerum vocabula amissimus:* he has not been stopped by forms of government, or theories of decay—he has gone to the man; but he has marked the symptom only, not the cure.

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partly from confusion of thought, partly from similarity of sound. There was a good English word in use before, and that was *Public weal**—public slipped into common, weal into wealth, and then we had a designation of contrasts, the converse of which was preposterous; *common* is the antithesis to *rare*, not private, *wealth* to *poverty*, not wrong.

From the decay of law, has sprung a new science, "*Political Economy.*" Here at least the words are pure uncorrupted Greek; and what are they? οικονομια πολιτικη. But these words stand in antithesis to each other, and while each term is Greek, in Greek the two could not be conjoined. As well might you say in English, "Common-wealth, domestic cookery;" for the one represents domestic, the other public concerns; the one means the *law* of the household, the other the *duty* of the state; terms equally contemptible and worthless in the eye of modern science, yet united to designate its most vaunted parturition. The great work originally expounding the so-termed science is designated, "The *Wealth* of Nations." It would puzzle a Roman, whether such a race was more to be pitied for its science, than detested for its sordidness.

But that Roman form thus disfigured and misapplied, what was it? Republic! RES-PUBLICA—public affairs. What volumes are not condensed in that single term! Public affairs! That is what societies have to attend to; that is the work to be done.

Freedom is not a modern fabrication. Let us then trace it to its original source, it meant and had

* "—— as the exchainge is the thinge that eatts ought all princes, to the wholl destruction of their *comon well.*"—*Sir Thomas Gresham's Letter to Queen Elizabeth.*

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exactly the same value in reference to the borough as kingdom, in reference to the state.

This weed has then multiplied itself. The Latin term for *Freed*-man, *libertus*, has been brought forth as a double to freedom, and with the assistance of a Greek termination, we have constructed *liberalism*. To this the antithesis is slavery: but as it has a double sense it must also have a double antithesis: to furnish that antithesis another phantom is constructed, *legitimacy*, which is the state of law or lawfulness which must mean, right: therefore liberalism must mean wrong. Freedom is also right, and yet its synonyme, liberalism, is wrong. Or go round the circle the other way, and each word is made to mean right, each word wrong, each similitude a contradiction, and each contradiction an identity. But you say "every one knows what we mean when we use these words! The words do not signify, it is the meaning we have to look to." The words would not signify if there was no meaning attached to them, but they do signify, because their confusion is reproduced within.

These substantives are next called *principles*, and men know themselves thereby, and one says he is a liberal, and the other says he is a legitimist; and then and therefore they wrangle, and then they fight, burn, and kill. They call this *progress!** They sail boldly and rejoicingly along, from a past that is despised to a future that is coveted because—both are unknown.

* "We are a mixed community, fortunately mixed in every way; and I hold that so far from this diversity of religion, politics, or situations being injurious, it is out of it arises that beautiful harmony of society, as in the natural world, from whence come useful results to individuals and general beauty to the whole frame of society."—*Speech of Mr. Wyse.*

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The world, and particularly Europe, is free at this day from the great evils, sufferings, and dangers that in different ages have oppressed the human race. There is no conqueror in possession, there are no preparations for invasion;* the great nations of Europe neither groan under foreign masters nor under domestic tyrants; no religious fanaticism binds its victims to the stake. In addition to these immunities, we have great and positive advantages. We revel in luxuries, abound in wealth, in literature and art; we produce, as it were by magic; science unlocks the riches of the soil, the treasures of the mine—multiplies the industry of the hand, transports from place to place with ease and speed, and exchanges spot for spot, nation for nation, benefits and wealth. The imagination had not in former times, even in its dreams, conceived a condition of more fortunate repose in the relations of empires, of more ample fruition of the gifts of Providence, or more successful application of the talents of man. And what are the results? Was ever the condition of the body of the nation so brutalised by deficiency of resources, or by excess of tyranny, as at the present hour? Whence then this result, save that we ourselves have made the laws by which we are governed.

To unlearn is our task. Bacon, following Jeremiah,† tells us to consider the old ways, and upon these to take our stand. What are these ancient ways?—the thought and feeling of a time which had not yet

* Danger from Russia exists not as proceeding from *her* strength, and comes not therefore within the scope of these observations. Danger from France is as a corollary to the Russian problem.

† "Thus saith the Lord, stand ye in the ways, and see, and ask for the old paths, where is the good way, and walk therein, and ye shall find rest for your souls. But they said, we will not walk therein."—*Jeremiah*, vi, 16.

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formed fictitious entities out of negative particles, to place in lieu of sense. Men founded societies to prevent crimes; the complete circle is run when it is from the crimes of governments that we suffer, and when the governments that inflict those crimes are the result not of foreign armies encamped upon our soil, or of mercenaries hired to enslave their fellow-subjects, but of the freedom of the people, and set up by the *majority* of its parliament.

It was a favourite saying of Bentham, that the wisdom of our forefathers was a mistaken expression; for as we possessed their experience, with that of all succeeding generations added to our own, we must be the wisest; and that as in each age there was accumulated the science and the knowledge of all its predecessors, therefore not the men of old, but we ourselves are the old and the wise people. If this were so, a nation's fortunes would flow on as a river. In furnishing a house, or studying a science, or storing a memory, if there be any thing wanting, that want you know. Not so of wisdom; he who wants wisdom wants every thing even to the knowledge of his want. We shall therefore say that we have wisdom when we have it not, and that those were destitute of it who possessed it. Wisdom and knowledge are not the same; it may happen that one is found where the other is wanting; it happens generally so*—the ignorant age being the age of wisdom—the learned age the age of vice and folly; the ignorant age the one in which states are built up—the learned age the time at which they fall.

* "Knowledge *without justice* is cunning, not wisdom."—*Plato.*

"Perhaps in this country there may be more knowledge than there was in former times, and less wisdom; more wealth, and less happiness; more display, and less virtue."—*Southey.*

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Are, therefore, ignorance and wisdom necessarily conjoined, and knowledge and folly? No, not necessarily so: for we have had restorers of states, and resisters of decay. They at least must have been learned in the learning of the times, and yet untainted with their corruption; they must have handled the nets, and not been caught; gazed on the dancing images, and not been dizzy.

These men did not go into the city to learn "policy," nor frequent the alleys for experience; they did not drink in present follies, nor scrape together accidents called history; but they went to the desert—they communed with themselves. Then did they command the alley and the city; then did they become teachers of what was right, and therein the makers of history.

Alfred founded no new system in England; he established well that which was in the existing thoughts: he went even to the laws of the Britons before him. Socrates told the Athenians that he taught them nothing new, and referred to the men of old; so did Solon; so did Lycurgus; so did Pythagoras. "Why," says Confucius, "do you commend me for my laws and morals? I have invented nothing new, and repeat only what was said of old." And in the book of Genesis itself, the Hebrews were told to observe the records of the generations of the past.

* * * *

A nation cannot give itself the liberty it has not; not so a man: he must free himself to be free, and then may he gird himself to the task of freeing others. "It is hard to be imagined," says Sir William Temple, "how far the spirit of one man goes in the fortune of an army or a state." And

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more aptly, as applied to our present disquisition, does Burke say these words, or words to this effect :—"That state is not lost that contains even one citizen who sees clearly that which is, or that which ought to be done; and it does not require that such citizen should occupy a station of pre-eminence." And so the Scripture :—"One wise man may save the city, though the *princes* be many thereof." A free man is a man who has emancipated himself from error, and that he can only do by detecting it where he can master it—in himself. It is not errors of his own original creating that he has to overcome, for that indeed would be a trifling matter; but the errors he has to break away from, and to cast off, are those of growing generations—these have come to him in speech. Until he has risen above speech—until he knows what it is to think without speech, he cannot be free himself. But there is no free man that is not a giver of freedom. He who has performed this service for himself, can, and must, render it to others.

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VI.—INTERVENTION.

"It is one of the signs of a degenerate age, and one of the means of ensuring its further degeneracy, to give lenient epithets to crimes."—*Burke.*

THE Transatlantic States are to be the field of a "Project of intervention." Three neutrals are to intervene between two belligerents. A course so novel has startled no one. It is not even worthy a Message from the Crown, and three months after the step has been taken, it slips out in reply to an incident of senatorial inquisitiveness.

A few years ago a grave charge was brought against Lord Palmerston for having *submitted* to an intervention in South America on the part of France. Lord Aberdeen who now fills the same post defended him on that occasion. The defence was not that France had not blockaded Buenos Ayres, nor that the blockade was legal; but—"There has been a similar act of OURS a few years ago in Guatemala." The man whose conduct is impugned is justified by the precedent of his own act, and the minister charged with one crime is secured *because* he had committed another. But the act ceased to be *his*, and became *ours* only because it was criminal. Senators and statesmen who fail to prevent and to punish, become accomplices, and such acts become not precedents only, but habits. Lord Aberdeen holding the blockade of Guatemala as England's, could only applaud France, who followed our example. Had it been a vague proposition, a fallacy, a mistake

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of figures, a belied prognostication, how quickly would the minister have been taken up by his opponent, or disavowed by his successor. When there is a case of crime those are conquered who have not punished; they must cower at once before the home criminal and the foreign aggressor.

"Policy" having been altered from what "*ought to be*" into what "*is*," it follows that whatever has been done may righteously be repeated. Thus, interference, sanctioned in the first instance, passes unheeded in the second, becomes habitual in the third: from a habit it comes to be a duty, being a duty in the minister,—it is, of course, a service to the State. Thus do we step out from real things into a world of dreams, from the light of truth and law to the delusions of opinion.

The rule for great matters in no ways differs from that which applies to the smallest; so testing *Intervention*, any one will immediately see that the "Policy" to which this term is applied, is as much at variance with our individual sense of honesty, as experience has shown it to be with our public interests.

Let us commence with *experience*, confining ourselves to the important acts of intervention, where there has been a concert for that purpose between various powers. There have been:—

A triple alliance for intervention in Greece, 6th July, 1826.

A quadruple alliance for intervention in Spain, 1834.

A triple alliance for intervention in Central Asia, 26th June, 1838.

A quadruple alliance for intervention in Syria, 15th July, 1840.

A quintuple alliance for intervention in Turkey, in respect to the Dardanelles, 13th July, 1841.

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Would Greece have been better or worse had we left her alone? Would Spain have been been better or worse had we left her alone? Would Central Asia have been better or worse had we left it alone? Would Syria have been better or worse had we left her alone? Would it have been been better or worse for Turkey, had the Dardanelles never been interfered with?

In each case the reply must be, that these countries have not benefited, but on the contrary, have suffered.* Yet the very object put forward for such intervention, was the good and well being of States or Populations which we considered inferior to ourselves in light, wisdom, religion, and civilization, even more than in power.

From the earliest times, down to the present hour, the rulers of Britain have denounced those acts to which is at present applied the term "intervention," when attempted by foreign powers: the Parliament and nation watched over its own government, so that it should not be seduced by its strength or its opinions into the perpetration of the like. No man has ever been found in England to declare intervention to be lawful, far less to assert that it was commendable or advantageous.

But how does such a statement concur with events? How can England abhor and practise the same thing? Speech has been perverted. Words have

* If it be said, with respect to Greece, that her Emancipation is owing to our intervention, the reply is this,—that had England acted legally,—that is to say, declared war against Turkey or advised with Turkey without Russia, that independence would have been at once obtained, without the consequences that have followed for Turkey, for Europe, and the long distraction of Greece herself, through diplomatic intervention.

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been introduced meaning two things at once. Double vision, by the mere repetition of the image, takes certainty from sight. What then must be the effect of terms which include not the repetition of the same object, but its opposite?

If for the distinct sense conveyed by virtue, patriotism, justice, and their opposites—corruption, faction, injustice, we got novel terms including shadows of both, applying at one moment to the virtue, at another to the vice—virtue and vice would cease to exist. Such terms have been designated by writers on international law, "Amphibologies."

"Intervention" is such a term. It is not to be found in the laws of Rome, or of Britain; it is in no Statute. Like Parricide among the Romans, or Infanticide among the Mussulmans, no law can be quoted against it, not however because it was held too monstrous a crime to be perpetrated, but too silly a word to be spoken.

To intervene means "to come between:"—but we have a legal term—Mediation, that is Arbitration; but for the latter, rules are laid down. Common consent is required, and the whole proceeding is judicial; that word then would not do for those who did not seek to repress but to commit wrong—Intervention was the word for them.

What do we *do* when we *mediate* in this fashion? We send men to Spain or Syria, to kill others. Any one of these men, brought before the Central Criminal Court of England, would have sentence of death pronounced upon him, on the simple proof of his share therein. He could plead only war,—a plea which he could not sustain, for there was no war. It is a simple case of felony. "Intervention" then means *murder*. It matters not whether this be done with-

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out any covering or with the pretext of a treaty.* The treaty would be nothing more than, in the case of a common murder, a compact to commit it. Murder is however used only as the means of perpetrating interventions; that crime is *subversion of sovereignty and independence.* In the eye of the law of England as well as of the law of nations, the concert between any English minister and the minister of a Foreign power, for the purpose of intervention,† constitutes that minister guilty, not merely of an act which justifies the state assailed "to treat" England "as an enemy,"‡ but, moreover, of treason or of misprision against the British crown.§

Such is the character of the chamberings and whisperings, the conferences and the protocols of secretaries of the council of foreign affairs; a single decision of a court of common law would put down this standing rebellion against all authority, just as a decision of a court of common law cleared away the general warrants of secretaries of state, after being practised in our internal government for a century.

Another source of the public confusion, is the practice of blockading. We blockade without war; we suffer others, by blockade, to interrupt our commerce, when there is no war. The nature of such proceedings is veiled from us by the practice of

* The force of a Treaty is in its ratification. This treaty was not ratified; so that even could a treaty be pleaded to stay judgment, that plea could not hold.

† All acts between England and a Foreign State require *by law* to pass under the great seal. For the regulations established by the constitution for the transaction of international business, and its progressive obliteration, see appendix to "Report of the Colonial Society on the Affghan War," and ch. iv. of "Case of McLeod."

‡ Vattell, Book ii, ch. iv, § 58.

§ Stat. of Treason, Rich. II. Levying war. Doing that by which is benefited an extrinsic power.

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intervention, which has broken down the barriers between peace and war. When I first endeavoured to expose this monstrous perversion, I was not understood. To say that no one comprehended is little; nobody cared. At length some little attention has been awakened, and there are some who begin to perceive that blockade cannot be resorted to in peace. At length the doctrine has found utterance in the House of Commons. And then the minister who has changed the practice admits, admits at once, that "blockade is a right of war,* and ought not to be used in peace." He says so, not to bar its use, but to facilitate its being so used. His acts do not depend upon his principles. The principle of government is now to say any thing that will allow you to do as you choose.

Blockade affects not belligerents but neutrals, who sanction the interruption of their trade by the belligerents, in order that the commerce of their subjects may not effect for one of the belligerents that which he could not effect for himself, in which case neutrality would be at an end. But now neutrals blockade belligerents.

Blockade is an *operation*, not a right of war; it is similar to the movement of an army or the fortifying of a camp; it is equivalent to bombarding with mortars or fighting with swords. To speak of blockade without war, is like speaking of broadsides without war. To blockade a port is indeed to attack a port; but that is not war,—war requires both cause and form. If it be the sign of degeneracy, and the cause of its increase, to apply to crimes epithets that are lenient, of what degeneracy is it not

* In war it is not resorted to, at least against the enemy.

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the sign and cause, to destroy the very name by which crime is known?

If then, by our intervention, these countries have suffered, what profit have *we* made? There are various kinds of profit—commercial advantages and immunities—booty—territory—exclusion of rivals, in trade or ambition—preponderance—also affection to be gained by benefits conferred, consideration and honour by dexterity and generosity. It is for a nation to choose between the profits of violence and those of good fame; but one or other it must have in view, when it undertakes to interfere in the affairs of its neighbours.

What profit, whether in commerce, prize money, territory, or influence, have we made in Greece? or in Spain? or in Central Asia? or in Syria? or in the Ottoman Empire? "*None whatever.*"

But where such immense forces have been engaged we must have injured ourselves. We did not stand alone; we had allies. Who were they? Have they signally injured themselves?

In Greece—*Russia* and *France* were our allies. Have either of these profited by the intervention? Yes; *one* of them. The one who has profited was precisely the power to counteract whom the alliance was planned.

In Spain—*France* was our ally. Has she profited? No; but Spain being distracted became a source of difference between the contracting parties to the great profit of another power.

In Central Asia—*Runjeet Sing* was our ally. Did he profit? To a certain extent: but again it was another power that reaped the advantage—the same power that had profited by the two above-cited interventions.

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In Syria—our allies were *Prussia, Austria,* and *Russia.* Have any one of these profited? Yes, one, by breaking up the good-will that had previously existed between the people of England and of France.

In the intervention of 1841 respecting the Dardanelles, our allies were *Austria, Prussia, Russia,* and *France.* Have any of these profited? Yes; again one of them: the others having bound themselves not to pass with their ships of war the straits that lead to the sea which lines Russia's southern limits, where her chief arsenals lie, where alone she can be assailed, and where her maritime means are preparing to assail others.

The results ascertained and established of past intervention are, therefore, 1st. Injury to each country on whose behalf we have intervened. 2. Loss to ourselves by the fact of intervening. 3. Dissension between ourselves and France. 4. Profit to Russia.

All these measures were secretly prepared and effected. The people of England, had it been made acquainted beforehand with what was doing, would never have suffered it.

The ancient doctrine and practice of England was to *prevent one State from interfering in the Affairs of another.* This was her law, and making it her strength, it became her greatness. "Balance of power," was the metaphor of an English monarch to designate *her* power so obtained, as explicitly stated by Vattel to result from her not having been in an equal degree with other states animated by the desire of territorial aggrandisement. When a great power proposed to the England of a better age to decide in common in the affairs of a smaller state, the English minister declared that the union of great

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states to interfere with the concerns of small ones, would "convert the world into a society of wild beasts."* At a period nearer our own, the British government replied to the overtures of the Holy Alliance in a circular to its agents: "The alliance (of England with foreign powers) was never intended as a union for the government of the world, or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other states."† And later still, the following words were uttered to the echoing cheers of Parliament; "the principle that every nation has a right to manage its own internal affairs as it pleases, so long as it injures not its neighbour. To this principle I most cordially assent. It is sound; *it ought to be* SACRED, and I trust that England will never be found to set the example of its violation:" ‡ During the present session interference has been spoken of as "a dangerous *principle*," and even a *recommendation* from a more powerful government would entail the overthrow of the independence of a weaker one.§

The study of international law has hitherto been a necessary qualification of those to whom have been confided the charge of public affairs. Wherever there have been great nations upon earth, in their acts will be found the elements of that science. We possess increased facilities for the knowledge of the past, and we universally admit religious, and even philanthropic obligations. We have moreover an additional inducement to that study in the necessity of guarding against the chances of being overreached, deceived, or misled.

* In Watson's Life of Philip II.

† Castlereagh in 1822.

‡ Lord Palmerston, June 1st, 1829.

§ Sir Robert Peel; Motion on Don Carlos.

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Our acts in Spain, Greece, Turkey, Central Asia, &c. have entailed heavy sacrifice in blood, money, and reputation. None of these acts could have taken place without the word intervention, which is used only because international law is no longer a study. To the same cause is to be referred the progress of Russia. To the same cause the profitlessness of our alliance with France. It was not by mutual concurrence in injustice, but common respect for right that in the words of Sir R. Peel, who has supplied sanctioning words for all things—the alliance of these two people could "become a pattern for the universe." Then would there have been no protocols and conferences disposing of the affairs of the world, blasting nations by secret whispers, and using the mightiest empires of the earth as if they were beings cast into mesmeric delirium.

The study of the law of nations was revived two centuries and a half ago, because of the lawlessness into which the nations of Europe had fallen. Some better spirits were touched by the sight, and powerful minds were moved to make the effort of restoring peace by expounding law: thence arose international law, as illustrated by modern writers;—codified indeed by them, but authoritative by the doctrines and the practice of earlier times. Have not the same necessities again arisen? The law still lives, and *foreign policy* may thus be brought even yet within the domain of the common law; but the people or some portion of it must understand the law before the case can be brought within reach of the judges of the land.

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VII.—INCIDENTS OF INTERVENTION IN 1854.

"A people violating (even for their profit) the law of nature and of nations, do but pull down the bulwarks that secure their own peace and safety."—*Grotius.*

One consolation remained to this country. The measures of which we have shown the injury and immorality, were measures of a party which has been in consequence of these driven from office. Their antagonists had not adopted these maxims, nor sanctioned these acts; and, though they did not arrest them, still they expressed their reprobation in every instance. On their accession to power we had a right to expect at least abstinence from the continuation of such practices.

Not having dealt, while in opposition, with *interference* as a breach of the law, the present government could not at once free themselves from its entanglements; but that they desired to escape from them no one could doubt, as appeared in the case of Spain; and then public organs took occasion therefrom favourably to contrast them with their Predecessors.

Nor is this position invalidated by their prosecution of the measures in China, which they had censured,—nor by the attack of Scinde,—nor by the policy pursued in respect to Serbia, which constitute the salient events of the world since their accession

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to office. In the first two cases, the question was not one of "intervention," but war: the cause and character of that war were alone in debate. In respect to Serbia we were involved in a treaty to maintain the Ottoman Empire, and the government conceived itself a party already engaged—it was not for *it* a question of the right to interfere, but of the mode of interference. They erred, indeed, but this was no evidence that they had ceased to regard the simple interference of one state in the affairs of another as unlawful, or that they were about to take the contrary maxim as the Rule of their own conduct.

In respect to other countries and subjects they showed a disposition the reverse of making quarrels, and presented a contrast with the noxious activity of past years, that sanctioned the statements made, and partly justified the merit claimed for them by their partisans.

Suddenly, however, this picture has been reversed, and within the course of the last month the intention has been proclaimed to interfere between belligerent powers in South America; to interfere in Greece to establish a Constitution; to interfere in Turkey to overthrow constitution and law.

In reply to Mr. Ewart on a motion respecting the hostilities between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video, Sir Robert Peel expressed himself in the following words:—"Whether it would be possible to put a stop to hostilities by force he would not say, but *it was quite clear* that if any armed intervention could be justified, it could only be so by the concurrence in it *of the three nations* most deeply interested in the termination of the war—Britain, France, and Brazil."

The present ministry have therefore adopted the

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maxim of their predecessors. War between Foreign States is a case for its application; concurrence of several, gives the right for its performance. All this Sir R. Peel *insinuates* under cover of a fallacy. Alarming as is the fact announced, more fearful is the mode in which it is conveyed. The bad objects of powerful minds was once to rise above their fellows; the ambition of the able is now to lower them.

There is in America a large field still unexplored, and virgin to Protocols, where Sir R. Peel may gain distinction for energy, benevolence, and success; he may teach us the geography of that hemisphere, as Lord Palmerston has taught us that of the other, by miseries inflicted and villanies achieved.

It is here necessary to prevent a misinterpretation of past occurrences, from being drawn into a false precedent. Mr. Canning is quoted as having already done the same thing in the same country. The authority of a thousand gifted statesmen and the precedent of a thousand time-honoured events cannot change the nature of that which is itself unlawful and immoral: If interference be so, precedent can no more sanction it, than murder can sanction murder, however often repeated. But the circumstances were different.

After laying it down that, "no nation has the smallest right to interfere in the Government of another,"* that to do so is to assault and destroy Sovereignty—that "no Foreign Power has a right to interfere with, and take cognizance of the Acts of a sovereign," Vattell proceeds to revolt, rebellion, or civil war, and says "if the prince, by violating fundamental laws,† gives his subjects a legal right to resist

* Vattell, Book ii. chap. iv. § 55.

† For instance, the Basque Provinces.

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him—if tyranny becoming insupportable obliges the nation to rise in their own defence,—every Foreign Power has a right to succour an oppressed people who implore their assistance * * * It is an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties. Whenever, therefore, matters are carried so far as to produce a civil war, Foreign Powers may take part with that party that appears to them to have justice on their side." When the bonds of political society are broken between the sovereign and his people, *the contending parties may then be considered as two distinct powers.*"

The "taking part" with one side is not optional co-operation without form or responsibility, but was just in its objects, lawful by its forms.

Mr. Canning in the case of the Spanish colonies did not surreptitiously interfere; he did not declare war against Spain, which, in as far as Spain was concerned, he could have done by the letter of the law; he confined himself to the simple recognition of that independence, he did not meddle between the parties nor confederate with others to do so. The act of Mr. Canning had no importance save this, that the continental practice of the last century, consolidated in the present, under the name of the Holy Alliance, had sanctioned the habit of interference in the affairs of state, *to support Governments or rather* CABINETS *against nations,* and to extinguish internal freedom, while annihilating international law; the recognition of the Spanish colonies, being in an inverse sense to this authoritative violence, was startling—it encouraged waning hopes, revived drooping spirits, appalled designing men, and gave promise of better times.

The present case is not between a sovereign and his subjects, but between two independent and

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belligerent powers; we are then neutrals, and what rights are more strictly guarded, what intervention or *partiality* more jealously watched over than in neutrals? We may ourselves become belligerent: but then we know what we do, our grounds are assigned, our subjects informed, all constitutional checks called in, the enemy is so constituted by law, the other powers of the world are appealed to, listen to our reasons, and judge our conduct. It is a judicial decision which we take. This is an attribute of sacred sovereignty. *Interference* implies the very reverse, and if criminal in peace, it is doubly so as applied to belligerents. Interference of *neutrals* is, moreover, a vital question for England, affecting (as it chiefly does) maritime contests, and being mainly prejudicial in its infringement to that power whose weight preponderates at sea. Mr. Canning declares a masked or imperfect neutrality, "would *inevitably ruin the character for honour and integrity* of any nation that should adopt it; but *more particularly would it be disgraceful to Great Britain*, who, when she was a belligerent had taught other powers the nature of a strict neutrality, though generally she had found them most reluctant * scholars."

These expressions (applied to acts of infinitely smaller degree) may appear vainly pompous to the present generation. The bounds being effaced between war and peace, there remains in the separate terms "neutral," "belligerent," no meaning. *It costs us nothing* to pass from peace to war; and of course we think that men have ever been so.

* The reluctance has not reference to the habit of *interfering between* States, but to interfering with the operation of our laws on prize and confiscation,—how much more then coercion of the belligerent governments?

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I do not write to describe what is, but to show what ought to be. Unless wrong could be corrected, speech was given to man in vain; a speech being given for our good, a man's judgments may be appealed to against his errors. Cherish "belligerent rights," and respect "neutral duties," you cannot, till you have conferred again on war its judicial import. Then would war, not so sanctioned, become impossible, and if attempted, bring down on the author prompt and terrible justice. If innocence was lost by the knowledge of good and evil, how shall evil be cured without knowledge of the law? When there is an evil purpose, the difference between right and wrong is known; but when acts have to be justified by "good intention," that condition is arrived at for which has been found the expression, "JUDICIAL BLINDNESS."

I trust then, that for those who have some other standard of right or wrong than public opinion,—it has been made clear, that we have no more right to interfere, being *neutrals*, between *belligerents*, than we have to interfere in the domestic concerns of any other state. I trust I have made it apparent that such acts legally subject us to retaliation.

Let us now consider the *circumstances* in which we interfere, and the *parties* with whom we associate ourselves.

Two republics are at war; we interfere to prevent a quarrel from being prosecuted to a settlement. It is not by legal procedure, it is not under sanctioned arbitration; we have no means of forming a just judgment, and no means of executing a sentence. All we propose to do is to *prevent collision at sea between the parties*. What is this if not to favour one party; for we cannot balance between them the

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loss or benefit of our interruption of their warfare. The least injury we can do, if we effect anything, is to preserve seeds of discontent, to prevent the exhausting of quarrel and the settlement of it *between themselves*, which alone can restore tranquillity;* but the natural consequence is, that we shall give new energy to national animosities, new objects to intrigue, new weapons to faction, and shall be ourselves involved through our agents in a circle of petty intrigues and animosities, to be the victims and dupes of cunning men in the separate state, or of the art of some one state which will use us against its neighbour. This people we have already debased by our loans, and inured to servility by competition for our

* The following is from a statement in a commercial letter, in the *Times* in the course of last month:—

"After this event (the battle of Arroyo Grande, on the 6th of December, 1842) there was nothing to oppose the army of Buenos Ayres in the Banda Oriental, and no doubt exists in the mind of any one, of whatever party in this country, that if there had *been no Foreign interference*, the war would almost immediately have been brought to a close.

"In the month of February, Commodore Purvis brought down from Rio de Janeiro the greater part of the British force; but it would appear that Mr. Mandeville had then altered his views. as he did all in his power to counteract and nullify the commodore's proceedings; and, incredible as it may appear, these two officers, the minister, and the Commander-in-Chief, are retained in their respective positions, each asserting that his conduct had been approved of at home by government, while they continue to act in a spirit diametrically opposed to each other—the one displaying all his sympathies, and exerting his influence in favour of the Buenos Ayrean, and the other of the Monte Videan cause—exposing themselves and their countrymen to every description of contumely and insult, which the Spanish and English language can furnish (for newspapers in both tongues are published both in Monte Video and Buenos Ayres)—endangering the safety of their countrymen by the irritation which such proceedings naturally create in the public mind, and destroying all the influence and respectability of the British name and character in the two republics."

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infecting favour. To engage in such a course, would inevitably ruin the character for honour and integrity of any people, and be peculiarly disgraceful to Great Britain. I implore every man who can feel for suffering, or abhor vice, to cease all other care, until this door be closed, and to labour to arrest a crime to which no passion impels, no profit invites, and which proceeding from no inveterate purpose, a word breathed in the proper quarter may yet suffice to stay.

One danger from our interference is, the existence of a *French* and an *English* party,—and France and England are *conjointly* to interfere. This union of England and France, admitting it to be at present sincere, will have the very opposite effect of extinguishing those rivalries; for each state and faction will aim at, and intrigue for, the conjoint influence of the alliance.

This brings us to consider our *associate*. We may cut this matter short by admitting that she acts as England does, quite as blindly, but not perhaps so carelessly.* What then, in starting from this point, is to be expected save failure leading to disunion?

Now, let us glance at the past. We have endured it—let us endeavour to extract some profit from it. *Each union has brought forth disunion.* This is a singular position, but it is a natural one. You have done what all wise men have warned nations against doing; you have done so, reckoning that *your alliance* would carry you through. Power so used has

* "Talk to the French chamber, or the French public, of English encroachments, English insolence, no matter how false and unfounded the charges, and every one is awake; but talk on any other subject—freedom of internal government, of religious rights, of trade, the abolition of slavery, or any other topic, and there will be neither audience nor debate."—*From the Organ of the Author of the Treaty of 15th July.*

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been broken in your hands: your strength has been turned back upon you. Your sacrilegious weapons will one day be bathed in each other's blood, and you will mutually avenge on each other your common guilt and folly. This will come with the certainty, if not with the order of the seasons. The vengeance of heaven will not slumber: the secular consequences of such imbecility must bring that ruin upon each which can only be effected by the fury of the other. —This is sequence, and no prophecy. Was the alliance not ruptured in 1840? What was the cause? *Intervention in the Levant!*

"Oh," it will be said "that was supposed to be so, but we now know that France took a course distinct from England: it was her fault; the disunion brought to a head in 1840 had really commenced in 1836. The foreign minister has stated this, and he has not been contradicted. M. Thiers, at the opening of the session, declared, that *France* had diverged from the line pursued by England, and that no real alliance existed in 1840."

All this alters not the fact, that the rupture of 1840 was on the Syrian question, and the result of a common intervention in the affairs of Turkey.

But supposing it was not so, and that the event of 1840 was a mere corollary, to the coolness of 1836. What was the cause of that coolness?—*The intervention in Spain!*

M. Thiers, in his speech of the 22d January, instead of representing, as stated by Lord Palmerston, the estrangement as not the act of England, did most emphatically declare it was. But in charging M. Guizot with inconsistency, he used an enigmatical expression which has been fixed upon and perverted. He said,—

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"*You* (M. Guizot) have said that it was not precisely the inconveniences of the Right of visit that was the true cause of the excitement of the country against the treaty of 1840, but the bad conduct of England in 1840. You have declared that it was in consequence of that conduct that the treaty failed. You have said so in the Chamber of Peers. You have said so here. I take you for judge. Have you not then mistaken the sentiments of the country! (Cheers)."

Both these ministers are fully agreed (and observe both are partisans of the English alliance, and both suffer by its rupture), that it was by England's act, in consequence of their common intervention in the Levant, that the hatred of France has been aroused.

M. Thiers disposes of the matter we are now examining in a pregnant sentence. After passing in review all our interventions,—Levant, Belgium, Italy, and Spain, he says, "*That which united us in all these questions has made way for that which* DIVIDES US."

In reference to the Spanish intervention he states in words veiled but not ambiguous, that while the French Government was acting in the spirit of the quadruple treaty, and desirous to co-operate cordially with England, *the King was listening to the suggestions of the counter-alliance* of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, to which the English and French alliance had given rise, and was *thwarting his own government, and ultimately overruled it.* (At a subsequent period, as is known, M. Thiers refused office because he would not consent to act secretly against England with the King.) In reference to 1836, he says:—

"Whilst," I quote from the corrected report,

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"the English Government earnestly urged us to energetic measures in Spain,* Austria counselled strongly not to follow the Whigs in their career of adventurous enterprise, and warned us against these personages, too boiling and too revolutionary. Austria was listened to, England was not—(*by the King*—subaudi). I speak of what *I have seen.* I say that only which the statesmen of Europe acquainted with the circumstances already know. From the period of this resolution the Alliance has been nearly dissolved."

He then proceeds to mention, that in the subsequent speech from the Throne, the phrase was introduced,—"Always perfectly united with the King of Great Britain, I continue to cause the quadruple treaty to be executed." This falsehood the English Cabinet meets by silence in the King's speech in respect to France, and that silence was a course designated by M. Thiers "as a signal manifestation of *a new revolution* of British policy."

This new testimony must establish indefeasibly the case established before, that the interventions engaged in, in common by these countries, have produced the present lamentable change in their reciprocal dispositions; are we dispensed from following the effects of repetitions of the like; the past reveals what the future will be. But now warned, we advance; infatuation is added to blindness; we are about to accumulate new on old grievances, and the point of departure is not now alliance, but ill-will; it is no longer the same men, but their antagonists

* Those who understand the part of Russia in all this, will appreciate the double perfidy of urging the French government through England, and operating on Louis Phillippe through Austria.

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who commence a-new a system which they had watched with anxiety and marked with reprobation. Nay, more, these new interventions are strained for on both sides, as the means of patching up the alliance, which being broken by fraud, they have neither the knowledge nor the honesty to restore.

I cannot resist here quoting the warning of M. Thiers to the present minister of France.

"What has been your object? Apparently to bring together the two countries * * *. Your impatient efforts to restore good-will, have only carried you further away from the end you sought."

In England, Sir R. Peel declares the Alliance restored:—he forces M. Guizot to belie him. To do so with effect, he attacks British Trade.* Sir R. Peel belied in his statement, has to seek or make occasion in South America, Greece, Turkey, or any where else, to exhibit the concord of the two Nations, heed-

* A recent consequence we extract from the *Leeds Mercury*:—

"Another augmentation of the Linen Yarn Duties in France. We regret to learn, by private letters which we have seen from Paris, that the French government is proceeding in its anti-English and anti-free trade policy, by making another augmentation of the duties on linen yarns. In the year 1842 a very large increase was made of the duties, for the purpose of excluding English yarns, or nearly so. That measure has not answered its purpose; a large, though a diminished, importation of English linen still takes place in France; and as M. Guizot finds that he could both gratify the malice of the war party and please the owners of the flax mills by still further augmenting the duty, he is about to take that step. The following are the intended duties, compared with the present scale:—

"Per 100 kilogrammes (including the additional 10 lbs.) equal to 2 cwt.

	1st Class.	2d Class.	3d Class.	4th Class.
New duty . . . . francs	52.80	77.00	110.	165.00
Present duty . . „	41.80	52.80	88.	137.50

"From *this augmentation Belgian yarns are to be exempted*, so that the blow at the English trade is distinctly marked, and advantages opened to Belgium as a consequence of our disunion."

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less how mischievous it is now, or dangerous hereafter.

"rimæ cum texit hiatum
Securos pendente jubet dormire ruinâ."

But is there nothing behind even all this? The "*State Papers*" of 1819, contain some strange documents respecting the founding of one or more French transatlantic dependencies under a Bourbon. In the "Congress of Verona" by M. Chateaubriand, the explanatian is given with a startling openness. This plan had been suggested by *Russia* in order to restore the maritime power of France, and enable her to "*be worthy of co-operating with Russia*" in destroying British commercial and maritime domination; the bait held out to France was, the *abrogation of the Treaties of* 1815!

France knew not of these projects of a *bribed** minister. Yet Russia was making France act upon them; and had they succeeded, as her projects did in Algiers, you would have had French susceptibility worked up to folly and fury on this field, as effectually as on the other. Witness such a misery as Tahiti—witness also the letter from Louis Philippe to the editor of the *Courier des Etats Unis*, respecting Canada. The eyes, not of France, but of her rulers, are turned beyond the Atlantic, for purposes not of "good neighbourhood." See the double attraction you present in your own physical weakness in the North, the French intervention to which you invite in the South, and the probability of a return to power in France of Russian partizans, and in England of a Russian agent. Recollect, too, France's illegal blockade of Buenos Ayres, and the aggression on

* Only £1400 a Year.

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British commerce then submitted to in perfidy, to assist and justify the rupture that was preparing.

So much for one of our confederates. Now let us look at the others.

A South-American State is to be associated in our South-American intermeddling. It is the only one that has retained its European structure. It has a line of ancient Sovereigns of great traditional ambition. It is favoured and patronized among regal houses by England; it was by England ferried across the Atlantic; it was by England elevated there to imperial dignity!* This government is incomparably stronger and greater than its distracted neighbours. With its enormous elements, its numerous population, its magnificent situation, its powerful positions, —will it be a stranger to ambition? With its ambitious character and pretensions, will the sole monarchy of the Western World not be disposed to enter the double career of territorial aggrandizement and doctrinal propagandism? Will it not be urged thereto by the new authority gained by concert with the great Powers of Europe? It has, according to Sir Robert Peel, the condition which gives pre-eminent "claims"—*interest in the question.* What line divides "claims" from "designs?" If France is moved to ambitious projects, will Brazil not be a fit instrument? Will not the Brazils become a temptation for France? Have you not sent thither a pompous embassy and failed? Is there not a family alliance just contracted with France? Good God! are there to be found, in our language, words accustomed to describe or denounce such infatuation as this? By the association to your confederacy of a

* Mr. Canning conferred the title of Emperor of Brazil to *spite* Russia!

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trans-atlantic state, you are preparing for that country, independently of all other results—a futurity of wars and convulsions. Rio is to become a Western Dardanelles.

The minister who drops the announcement of this insanity on the British House of Commons, in an insidious sentence, is hailed by that assembly as "*a minister of Peace.*"

Your Peace-maker makes here a war for vengeance; then justifies it on "principle,"* now exacts plunder by armies, now interferes with the justice of others by fleets.

And where is all this intervention to end? If "*improper acts,*" or "war," or "bad government," be of themselves reason why we should interfere, then we ought to have a new code. If bad Government is a justification for our interference, it becomes our duty to interfere wherever it exists. We must go and seek it wherever it is to be found. There is no middle course. If intervention is not unlawful, it is obligatory. If we can have in any case grounds for interfering, we cannot escape from interfering whenever such grounds exist.

If it is our duty to interfere, it becomes our duty to suffer it. The consequence must be interference of each state in all other states; interference will be backwards and forwards; aud reciprocally in opposite senses till chaos ensues.

But it is not merely to collisions in the Western

* "I am afraid there is some great principle at work when civilization and refinement come in contact with barbarism, which makes it impossible to apply the rules observed toward more advanced nations; more especially when civilization and refinement come in contact with barbarism, *in an immensely extended country.*"—*Sir R. Peel on the war in Scinde.*

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Hemisphere—or to codes in protected Greece, that this exuberance of public charities applies—we take in infidels and Turks. The English and French governments have recently required:—"That the punishment of death should not again be inflicted upon Rayahs, who, having embraced Mahometanism, might subsequently recant its tenets."

Turkey does not possess an assembly for manufacturing laws. There is no possible way by which the requisition of these foreign governments can be acceded to, save by an act of usurpation on the part of the Sultan. At one and the same moment you are laying prostrate international law in America, making a constitution in Greece, and destroying one in Turkey. The disinterestedness of the idea is however great. Turkey still clings in untiring confidence to you as her support against your common enemy: her good-will as her internal order, was your strength and best possession; by the same blow you level both, if you succeed; and cast her into the arms of your enemy, if you fail. Was ever such exhibition of civilizing propensities?*

See the consequences:—

"The Turkish Ministers regarded the demand as an interference with their national independence and their religious laws, and were determined not to yield the point, and abide the consequences of their refusal."

Another report says:—"It appears that the greatest excitement has been caused at the Porte by the demand of the English and French Ambassadors,

* The *Chronicle* remarks "As the affair stands at present, Russian influence at Constantinople has but to instigate the execution of one relapsed Christian in order to drive the rival envoys of France and England from the field."

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that the Sultan should give a formal engagement to forego hereafter all religious executions. The Ulema, or supreme council of the church, has been called on to aid the deliberation of the Divan; as, on the one hand, the Porte has the dread of disobliging the representatives of the great powers; and on the other, of shocking the prejudices of the Mahomedan people, on which its existence is based."

I know not how to proceed. To argue with such a nation, or to reason upon such facts, would be like appealing to the understanding of a maniac, or drawing conclusions from his acts.

Last month England learnt that the British representative at Constantinople had been interfering to interupt communication between Circassia and Turkey. This month we learn that the Russian representative had been following up his blow; how is it that in projects of reform and economy, no one proposes that Russia be called upon to pay the salaries of British ministers at home, and British ambassadors abroad?

The Newspaper correspondence from Constantinople had been remarkable for its intelligence, and for the union of the correspondents of the different organs, in exposing the fatuity of our acts. But now a pit has been dug for them, and they have fallen into it. While they spoke words good, useful, and necessary, no one heeded them, *now* they will be heeded. The recent act of diplomatic fanaticism is thus by them represented to England. "These ministers (who inflicted death upon the Armenian renegade) did answer to the representatives of the interceding powers, that in future such executions should be avoided. The engagement, not solemnly given, was deemed to be sufficiently guaranteed by

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honour and *good faith*. Scarcely two months elapse when these ministers inflict death on an unfortunate Christian for alleged apostacy. The crime (of the Turkish ministers), aggravated by such marks of dishonesty and insult, has elicited violent measures from the English and French governments." Every word of this statement is a falsehood. No Turkish *minister* could give a promise on such a subject—no Turkish minister could inflict such a penalty. The Turkish minister did not, in the one case or the other, inflict that penalty. It was a judicial sentence, with which no one could interfere; and in Turkey even yet ministerial "*responsibility*" has not succeeded in subverting the powers of a tribunal, or the authority of law,—however unconscious of the fact the European population or the newspaper correspondents may be.

The writer proceeds thus:—

"It may be asked, on the other side, what right we have to interfere with these religious ordinances of an independent people? We only answer, *the right engendered by the noblest impulses of humanity, founded upon a great moral principle, and sanctioned by the tolerant and civilizing spirit of the age,* the right which *enables* a powerless potentate *to demand* toleration for the Catholic Church, when oppressed by one of the most powerful monarchs of the world."

You have then a different rule of right for Turks and Americans. You discriminate by Sir R. Peel's "great Principle." Lord Denman, speaking of the Louisiana case, says—

"*I am aware that it is impossible for the state to interfere.*"

He again says—

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"No one can be more sensible than I am of the *duty* and *right* of all states to form their own laws. And I am also sensible how jealous every state is of being interfered with in their execution."

Was Lord Denman aware that *we*—the English nation—or certain men acting for us, had done in Turkey what he, a Judge, held it "*impossible*" *that the state could do?* His judgment we have here as distinctly as if the case had been brought before him on the bench. Would it not then become a Judge of the land to raise his voice against the crime of his own government, where he, not denouncing, became a party, and where that voice did possess weight and efficacy, before giving his care to the distant provinces of an alien government? If charity begins at home, surely repression of vice and crime, beginning not there, must be a mockery and a deceit.

I thank the writer for placing in parallel the two cases; but would any one, save a hireling, a fanatic, or a fool, not have reasoned from the case of the Pope thus—"go and do justice in Poland, where you are bound and called upon, before you come to interfere in Turkey, where you have no right, and where your interference will only help the common enemy that will soon treat all of you, Protestants and Mussulmans, as she is now treating Poland?"

It is strange that, at this moment, two signal changes have been effected in legislation, as bearing on capital punishment and proselytism. These have simultaneously occurred in the Eastern and Western hemispheres. The one in Greece, the other in Louisiana. The first makes among Christians proselytism penal, though the *punishment* is not yet specified. The other makes assistance given to the escape of a slave a *capital offence!* Greece we have

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wrested from Turkey—we have moulded the state and controlled it—we could not exert our civilizing disposition to prevent the introduction of so fanatic a spirit into a code to which we give our sanction—abhorrent as is the late judgment in Louisiana, we dare not threaten the United States.

The Turks have never done injury to England—they have suffered the most cruel injury from us—they afford a field for trade and commerce—they suffer us to grow rich on their soil without requiring any thing in return. We have a population subject to the British crown, amounting to 7000 or 8000 persons in Turkey, over whom we are allowed to retain entire jurisdiction, giving to Turkey in return, no right of jurisdiction over her subjects in our territories. We are the benefitted parties in the intercourse, and the solely profiting parties by the bonds that connect us. Yet so little do we fulfil the obligation of exercising that jurisdiction which she yields to us, that we have established no tribunal to repress misdemeanours and crimes.*

England has bound herself by Treaty to maintain the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman empire: this law existed when that compact was made. It is not asserted, as it was by Prussia in respect to Poland in 1772, that an internal change had abrogated an external guarantee. England has interfered *in common with another power*, giving the character of conspiracy to the crime, to require the law to be set aside; that is to coerce the highest tribunal in the land, and one possessing rather than

* The Christian murderer of a Mussulman, is by England withdrawn from the judicature of the country, submitted to no judicatory by England—he is merely shipped off, and may in a few months re-appear to murder another.

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the sovereign the attributes of supreme power. France and England do not threaten war, but they insinuate that they shall give up the Ottoman empire to Russia, into whose hands they have already betrayed it. Can there be in England men to plot and execute such villany? are we men to endure it? There is heaping up a store of vengeance. Such acts are too often repeated—they come in too many shapes.

Suppose France and Russia were to signify, through their representatives, to the English government, that they would not suffer the execution of some sentence against a housebreaker or a murderer, and that this was done to embarrass or to change a ministry. What would Englishmen say to these nations?

A Constantinople correspondent writes:—

"Those who are acquainted by long residence with the country, dread the results of this interference with the religious prejudices of the people, and anticipate a popular outbreak; those who have followed the diplomatic affairs of the last ten years expect only a change of ministry."

Can there be any thing more devoutly to be prayed for than disunion between England and France, since their so-called alliance brings such fruit. Singly, neither of them could have dared.

We who cannot maintain our laws at home, interfere to prevent the execution of the laws elsewhere. We, who dare not utter a word, when half a million of people are smitten by an infamous decree on the part of a cabinet, our ally, quarrel with a state that we pretend to protect, because in the execution of its laws—laws that have been unchanged for centuries, a human head falls to the ground. If you overstep the bounds of your own duties and rights, to prevent

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that which is wrong in Turkey, why do you neglect Russia? Why do you not correct Prussia? There was no law existing in Russia for the expulsion of the Jews, or the persecution of the Roman Catholics; there was no law in Prussia to enact perfidy and violence against the Poles. The act of Turkey was performed under an obligation which the dictates of right and reason bound you to respect.* The acts of Prussia and Russia are voluntary and in violation of compacts which you are bound to enforce. To interfere in Turkey you had to violate the solemn engagements that you had entered into. Not to interfere in Russia, you had also to violate your engagements. On what ground then do you take your stand? It is not on law. If it be upon humanity, make equal distribution of your sympathies. Or is this a pretext for partitioning Turkey? Lord Palmerston is *not* Foreign minister.

Heretofore interfering in the affairs of a Foreign state was considered a heinous crime by Englishmen; men took credit to themselves for denouncing it, just as they would for bribery or corruption. Now one party after the other has fallen into it, practise it with parade on every occasion in matters the most diverse, on fields the most remote.

To allege good intention is what every criminal will do, if he can, in mitigation of his sentence. This is the *reason* which the British government alone has to offer for its acts!

Sir R. Peel, on the 8th of February, gave credit to Lord Auckland for being moved (in acts, which have brought the loss of 15,000 British lives, and have

* The capital punishment of relapsed apostates has always been considered by the Eastern Christians as the *protection* of the *Christian* faith.

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been judged by Sir R. Peel to have been both disadvantageous and unjust) "by the purest motives." On the 14th of March, he "called upon the House to believe that in the instructions which they had sent to Greece, they (the Government) had been influenced by the purest motives." On the 7th of March, Sir R. Peel, in replying to the charges of partizanship of our officers between Monte Video and Buenos Ayres, said, "If they have stepped beyond the strict line of their instructions, they have been influenced by the best of motives."

When Sir R. Peel will have descended to the grave, what sentence of his will survive to future generations? Throughout the dreary mass of his mispent speech, what passage can be found that shall be quoted, beside the words that have been handed down to us from the men who have restored the affairs of nations?

Yet this is the leader as well as the sample of the age. Is there not one amongst the leading men of England who will *withdraw for a time from its idle occupations* to qualify himself for performing to his country the service of saving it?

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VIII.—APPEAL TO THE COUNTRY.

To the statement that the use of Parliament, and purpose of a Crown, were alike frustrated by the usurpations of the House of Commons.* The following objection has been urged by a leading politician :—

"Though the ministers of state have to be appointed by the crown from the majority, still, if the king or queen approves not of those ministers, the crown has the power of dissolving the parliament, and *appealing to the nation;* and this is the proper constitutional practice. It would never do for the crown to have the power of imposing *its* ministers upon the nation against its will; but by its power of dissolving the parliament, the crown can take the sense of the nation."

If the king is invested with the prerogative of executing the law, the parliament is invested with the high function of calling to account and punishing his servants who offend. This is the simplest scheme of government ever devised, and is also the law of England. If you have the House of Commons imposing *its* ministers on the Crown, you have no longer a Crown; if the House of Commons has its ministers it is itself no longer a check upon the Crown: if this be done by a faction or a majority, why then you have no longer a House of Commons.

* In reference to an article entitled "Cabinet and Parliamentary Government," *Portfolio* (new series) Vol. III, page 581.

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It is admitted that the real function of the crown is the appointing of the ministers, but it is averred that these functions are limited *in practice*. Here is a manifest contradiction. As well might it be said, it is and it is not the duty of the crown to appoint its ministers. "*Appeal to the country!*" A century and a half ago there was still a country as there was a crown; there is now no country—there are only the factions. The word therefore has no longer a meaning. The crown formerly, if overridden by faction, might have appealed to the country—it could not do so now even were there a country. To appeal to the electors against ministers imposed by the majority of the elected, is to appeal from the majority to the minority. The country's intervention can appear only in changing one majority into another, and imposing upon the crown another set of ministers; and this imaginary appeal is said to be a "constitutional PRACTICE!" Either it is the right of the crown to appoint its ministers, or it is not. If it is its right, it is its duty.

"It would never do for the crown to have the power of imposing its ministers upon the nation."—But it had just been admitted, that the very function of the crown was to appoint the ministers. Why would it never do for the crown to appoint them? What has the nation to do with the persons who fill high offices, any more than with the person who fills the highest office? What the nation has to do with, is *their acts*; and it is precisely because the nation has lost control over these, that their persons have become a matter of importance. "The crown can take the sense of the nation!" Let us see how. A set of ministers are *imposed* upon the crown; they have, therefore, the majority in the House, and, of

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course, for the time being in the nation. The Queen henceforward can only act through them; and it is through those very ministers that she is to take against them the sense of the nation, in which they have the majority—or, in this case of the cotemporary shifting of parties in the country, still retaining the majority in the House, which they are to dissolve because favourable to themselves! This is the doctrine of the constitution, as laid down by a practical politician and a gifted man. Such is the result of attempting to find reasons in accordance with the constitution for a practice subversive of it—a practice which would ruin inevitably any private concern into which it was introduced. It is, in plain language, converting the body that is to control into the body that is to act; making the officer that is to act, lend his sanction to the act which he does not perform.

There was, however, one occasion on which a Queen did appeal to the country. The successes of the war under Anne, and the ambition and designs of Marlborough, had to a degree unknown at any previous period rendered the cabinets independent of Queen and Parliament, and they combined to exclude their opponents from the Council. Having great popularity, and having allied themselves with foreign powers and statesmen, the Queen found herself as it were in their hands, and the cabal of two reigns before was revived in an opposite sense—no longer to serve but to enslave the monarch. The Queen did make an effort: she dismissed the ministry, and appealed to the country, but she dismissed the ministry first. "The Queen," says Smollett, "was greatly applauded for thus asserting her just Prerogative, and setting herself free from the arbitrary cabal by which

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she had been so long kept in dependence. The Duke of Beaufort went to the Court on this occasion, and told her Majesty that he was extremely glad that he could now salute her *Queen indeed.*" What was the consequence? The Queen having got rid of the faction *as a party*, fell into the hands of another. From that hour to the present the notions of every man in England have been entirely the reverse of what, down to that period, they ever had been. Up to that period our forefathers held the chief of a department responsible for his department, and would have considered government by a club acting in concert, to keep or resign their places together, and supported by a faction without, an "insolence to the crown," as said Bolingbroke, and an "intollerable tyranny over the people," as said Ralph.

In 1711 the Parliament offered advice to the crown in respect to the Spanish succession. Several peers signed a protest against this address, as an infringement of the royal prerogative. They meant that the Queen, in the exercise of her Prerogative, having to act through persons responsible to Parliament, the advice offered would diminish the responsibility of those individuals, and stay the hand of Parliament from subsequent proceedings, and to this end wished to take care, in the words of Sir R. Walpole, "that the ministry's war did not become the parliament's war." But if the Parliament appoints the ministers, it undertakes the management of those concerns. No! it knows nothing about them. While negotiations are pending it is warned off by the royal prerogative, so that the majority which nominates them instantly loses all control over them.

Formerly there was danger to the minister *after he fell;* but in process of time an interest of *cabinets*

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sprang up and even that chance was lost: now the maxim is, that the existing government is not to "*lend its weight* to crush its predecessors."*

Permanency is generally considered an attribute of excellence; here that which is permanent is evil. It is the permanency of continuous destructions. Each party when acquiring the occasion of conferring the greatest benefits on their country, and securing authority and command for themselves, are able to use that station only in such a manner as to make themselves contemptible, and so raise the character of their predecessors. Thus is party and faction not a state of enmity but of mutual understanding, the knowledge of which is restricted to the higher sphere, whilst the vulgar of faction are made to wage fierce war the one on the other. From this has resulted an anomalous condition, of which some future historian may make the discovery, and it is this, that the permanency of the system depends upon the shifting of the men. Periodically the nation becomes disgusted and indignant—it will endure it no longer—it changes the men. The unendurable measures are endured under the new names, and this results from the wonderful delusion in the minds of all that there is yet a country to appeal to.

We hold the maxim, that the king can do no wrong; but does a king do no wrong in abdicating the use of his power?† What greater wrong can he do? and does not the epithet of treasonable apply to the mal-practices by which men shall contrive to *prevent* the king from doing what he ought to do—the appointing of fit and proper persons to be his

* Sir R. Peel in the debate on enquiry into the Affghan war.

† The power of the crown revives the moment the wearer knows its use.

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servants? Persons cannot be fit and proper if they are favourites and partizans of the sovereign himself; and how much more of a faction or a mob!

The first step in decline was neglect of parliament to do its duty, in preventing wrong, and impeaching ministers for crimes. The result was, despite their own maxim, that the king could do no wrong, that they uncrowned, beheaded, and expelled *kings*. A king can do no wrong! yet you punish him, and change after change of man or dynasty follow—rebellion against kingship—restoration of kingship—revolution. Articles of impeachment are exhibited against the king for deeds declared "*illegal*," none of which the king could have done himself, which he did through ministers, and for which they were not held to answer. The king is expelled—the ministers remain *in office*!

After the revolution, the government was conducted by selecting from each party the leading men. This man was said "to undertake" for the Whigs—that man, "to undertake" for the Tories. A majority in the House was ever ready to rise upon the ministry, censure their measures, inquire into their acts, thwart their objects, and yet never thought of displacing them as a body: one might be taken into custody, another sent to the Tower, another impeached, another voted an enemy to the state because of the advice he had given to the crown. They were, in fact, dealt with in an individual not a corporate sense. But as party became intense, then did each come to preponderate *alternately*. For a time government poised itself between them—at last government was usurped by party. Parliament supersedes crown—majority supersedes parliament—party supersedes majority. The several parties are then superseded by

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the mutual understandings of the clubs, so that each club, in the alternations of power, secures the monopoly of place for its individual members.

So old as Henry III the debate was, whether the king or the parliament should name the chief officers of state; but, then, the object was to prevent mere favourites and partizans from being placed in stations of dignity and trust. In those times all men were as alert respecting the misconduct of a minister as they are now in respect to that of a private man.* Now, the circle has completed the round; for it is no longer the favourites of the monarch whom the parliament rejects; it is the favourites of the faction who are imposed on the monarch. The favourites of a monarch, parliament could hold to account, and bring to justice; the favourites of the parliament—styled *confidential* servants of the crown—are invested with "responsibility" that is they may break the law, dispense with it, or make laws to legalize misdeeds.

Yet this omnipotent assembly, and the super-omnipotent majority therein, are not allowed to have their own way! Parliament does not rule, it is the

* "Each member of Parliament was the king's 'servant,' the king's 'Minister,' the king's 'responsible adviser.' The fiction of a Cabinet was then unknown. When all Parliament men and king's executive officers were alike servants of the Crown, no prejudice of caste, no interests of party intervened to screen such as were guilty or incapable from the pursuit of the rest. Ministers themselves were often the first to grant redress against the acts of their fellows. In the reign of King Henry III, the Lord Protector Pembroke is recorded to have given relief, as prayed, to one aggrieved by his Highness's own colleague, the Justiciary of England. In criminal cases, recourse was had to the formidable method of impeachment before the Council itself or its Committee. *It was generally sufficient if the presentment were made upon the oaths of 'twelve men,'* as in cases of meaner delinquency."—*Anstey's Const. of England.*

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very slave of the two clubs of leaders.* In a grave matter they must not have their own way, because it is important, nor in a trifling matter, because it is insignificant. Men sent to represent, not grievances but opinions—an assemblage conducting public affairs, not because they concur, but because they disagree—such is the House of Commons, appointed to redress grievances, become, of all grievances ever conceived or endured, itself the greatest. This assemblage, which neither represents the country nor controls the government, disposes of the one to the other, and then declares itself—omnipotent! They have such omnipotence as felons have, except that thereto is added impunity.

This may be beneficial to a few; but even to those to whom it is so, it would be abhorrent, if their own right reason could prevail; to the rest of the nation, it can prove no benefit or advantage whatever, deleterious to the public, it is so to individual interests. Let us cease to speak of loyalty, or let us restore to our sovereign her freedom, and her power, in order that she too may be able to speak what is true and do what is right.

* "The English people imagines that it is free, but it is much mistaken; it is free only during the election of members of Parliament: as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved, it is nothing."—*Rousseau.*

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IX.—STANDARD OF VALUE.*

"The country is exposed to perpetual oscillation between hollow prosperity and real calamity, whereby uncertainty is introduced into the value of all property, and a spirit of gambling and fraudulent speculation into the ordinary transactions of domestic life." —*Sir James Graham.*

THE accession of George III divides political discussion into two parts which present the most striking contrast to each other. The first offers practical and immediate remedies for known grievances —the second speculative remedies for sufferings. Suffering, which is not the result of wrong, it is not the province of political institutions to avert, or of politicians to deal with: wrong is to be remedied only in its causes. When wrongs have been suffered blindly, it is not to be expected that they can be remedied intelligently: then the remedy becomes the worst part of the disease. Such is our condition in respect to the money of the realm.

In the Pentateuch a curse is pronounced against the man who changes the weights and measures. In the present day, the laws of exchange are based upon a constant alteration of weights and measures.

The value of gold is to be measured by itself; how can any substance be the measure of its own worth—in other things? the worth of gold is to be es-

* In the design of these Essays, the present was to have followed one on THE CREDIT SYSTEM, tracing the process of the accumulation of debt from 1688 to the fallacy contained in that term. That Essay has so extended from its historical nature as to have become unavailable for its original purpose.

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tablished by its own *weight*, under a false denomination of that weight—and an *ounce* is to be worth so many "*pounds*" and fractions of pounds. This is —falsifying a *measure*, not establishing a *standard!*

The gold money that circulates in England amounts to but a tenth part of the paper money that circulates with it, and both constitute but a small portion of the aggregate wealth and obligations of the community and of individuals. This mass is subjected to change by every change in this fictitious standard.

The worth of gold, like that of any other commodity, depends on the quantity on hand—make it depend on the amount of paper in circulation, which paper is to be regulated by it!

If I give a man a piece of coin in lieu of something else, it is barter. If I give him a note of hand, or if he trusts me without it, it is credit. All the reasoning in the world will make nothing more of commerce. All that philosophers ever talked or wrote, could not disturb a single transaction of the value of a groat between the humblest artizans, it is another thing when idle speech is transformed into legislation. "A standard of value" as a proposition is an absurdity, but when parliament decides that you shall not measure this commodity by that commodity, according to your wants, or those of others, but by a curious plan of its own "for regulating the Bank issues," "preventing fluctuations," and "protecting the nation against the drain of Foreign Exchange,"—then is it colossal robbery.

Gold and silver are the commodities that most fluctuate in value. No others have to the same extent varied in quantity or worth; there having been in one age no less than twenty times as much of them as at another age, and the difference of their

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exchangeable value against other produces, being no less at one period than sixteen times what it has been at another. If the quantity of goods in a country augment, the money remaining the same, the latter will increase in value, and *vice versa:* in other words, prices are high or low, in proportion to the quantity of the money in circulation. *If there were no laws regulating the standard of value, these differences would matter nothing;* for one half or one quarter, or one-twentieth part of the existing coin would as efficiently perform the service; but when you have fixed a standard of value and have reduced to it taxes, rents, bonds, then every fluctuation of the value of gold on every contraction or extension of the paper in circulation, convulses society. When paper, from sign of trust between man and man, becomes money by government authority, then is it liable to be *increased* or *diminished* by a secret and irresponsible power, and becomes the most terrible of scourges ever devised by, or inflicted on man.

The consequences are too intricate for observation; too mysterious for exposure: they may be compared to private robberies committed by or on each individual throughout the land. If there were equality in the number of the sufferers and balance of profit and loss, still would this be atrocious and inconceivable; but what is it when millions are sacrificed for the benefit of tens, and the wealth so accumulated is smitten with barrenness! It is a matter of congratulation rather than of regret, that hundreds of millions wrung from the sweat of pauper-branded brows have been sunk in foreign loans and projects.

Before the general coinage of Henry the Seventh, the seniorage and the laws affecting circulation made

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the money-changers exceedingly averse to the use of English coin, and the excess of exports over imports (three-fourths, or sometimes four-fifths) was paid for in foreign coin or bullion, so that there was to be found in common traffic in England, every denomination of foreign coin from those of Byzantium to those of Lisbon; gold and silver circulated also by tale and in grain, and it required great experience in the detecting of coins and in the assaying and weighing of metals to traffic therein: this was the trade of the goldsmiths and Jews, exercised under severe penalties. There was no subject of deeper importance to the public, and several Parliaments were assembled in consequence of the general suffering from counterfeit money, after many failures at last the cure was found and it was A STANDARD OF METAL. The British coin was now the most pure in Europe, and our coinage was the model for other states. The "currency" was brought to the most perfect state that it was possible to imagine; gold and silver coin wanted for the purposes of commerce was reduced to a known quality and quantity as signified by the mark it bore —further than this *no law*.

We pass down two centuries and a half, during which care has relaxed and abuse revived,* and we find England convulsed again with currency. We have not relapsed into our former errors, but have entered upon a new field: we are in chase of an "ideal standard." We now scout the touchstone and the

* Lord Liverpool mentions in his celebrated letter that the coinage had deteriorated in the time of William the Third 40 per cent., but he rates the value by the metal, leaving out of consideration the change in its worth by the influx from America. William's bill to *restore the currency* was analogous to Sir R. Peel's measure of 1819.

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scales as childish things; we call for law to make value *immutable*!

Value means what a thing is worth of *something else*—the worth of each shifting by the worth of all other things by it. The value of coin depends upon its scarcity, or its abundance. The worth of corn upon the land on which it is produced—the relative proportion of pasturage and tillage—the instruments of agriculture, manure and drainage—the internal arrangements of the farm by which the husbandman and the labourer are united or dissevered in interests—on the condition, moral and practical, of the labourer—the repose and tranquillity of the country—the amount of taxation—on the science employed in the abstraction of ores (iron or gold) from the bowels of the earth—but far more than all these, upon the mode of taxation. So, likewise, every other produce. There is no fixed rule nor rateable tides or ebbs for any one; and if there were a rule or a thousand rules or fixed ebbs or tides, it would not depend on parliaments to control them. If, then, there is a quantity of corn to be exchanged for a quantity of copper, or of iron, it is upon the relative worth of each, known by each man upon the spot, and by each trader, and never inquired into as a philosophical question—that must depend the quantity of the one to be given against a certain quantity of the other.

"The difference in the price of commodities," says Jacob, in his inquiry into the precious metals (vol. i, p. 163)), "only really marks the fluctuations in the price of gold and silver." There have been famines in cities filled with hoarded treasure. Corn has been worth more than its weight in gold. The fluctuation of one cannot rate the fluctuation of any other. Nevertheless corn has been considered the most

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steady meter of the prices of other objects: it is by corn that we ascertain the value of gold, not by gold that of corn. At the period of the fall of the Roman republic, and within the compass of a single life, the change of relative value, between gold and corn, was so great, that the measure of the latter which sold for 1*s.* 4*d.* of our money, cost £1. Corn had not become dear, but gold cheap. In striking the average of the price between the time of the discovery of the American mines and the beginning of this century, gold and silver have fallen in command over the necessaries of life in an equal proportion.*

"Much puzzling," says Cobbett, "has arisen on this subject, from this, that the note always retained its *nominal* value, and always goes by the same name—a pound-note is still a pound-note, whether it be worth as much as it was or not, and this is called the *Standard of Value.*" The pound-note has no character belonging to a standard. Indeed it is exactly the reverse of a standard—for it is *the thing itself.* A thing fluctuating and a name permanent! In 1841 a pound was equal to a certain number of pounds of grain, and in 1843 it was equal to a different number of pounds of grain; it was consequently no longer the same pound—the change was not in

* The price of bread at Rome under Augustus, and in England at the beginning of this century, has been estimated equal to each other: this has been one ground for inferring equality in the quantity of the precious metals in circulation at the two periods; but the Excise in Rome not falling on consumption, the money value of bread would be much lower. It might be said that our dexterity in agriculture would compensate for the burden and the mode of our taxation. This is to be answered by reference to countries where agricultural methods as rude as those of Rome are employed, and where yet the price of corn is infinitely lower than it is in England, with all our improvements and means of transport.

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the grain but in the pound. The harvest or the seasons influenced not the market, but changes in our laws regulating the taxes! In 1822 corn was worth 43*s*. the quarter; in 1820, 65*s*.; whence this difference? The amount of loan of the Bank to the Government. Some millions are lent to Government, and therefore so many more millions of paper are put in circulation; more money must be given for every thing, for money is cheapened; and this is called "Government *securities*." In the one case a tariff, in the other an operation merely of banking, which at the time no one knows of, changes every pound in every man's pocket; the value of every obligation, the amount of every tax: one man gets more than his due, another less than his right: the rich is made richer, the poor impoverished, and all this comes from what? From taking that which is liable to fluctuations from every cause and calling it Standard of Value; doing this, you are lost in a maze of idle words and a chaos of confused results, and thus the Parliament exercises its privilege of *making laws*. Formerly there was fluctuation in price, the result of circumstance; now there are convulsions in price, the result of legislation—the pretext being to keep prices steady! There is nothing great that is not natural; here the greatness of the measure depends upon its being so unnatural, that the sense of common men is overwhelmed, and the people are struck dumb and so led to slaughter.

And in what did the measure of 1819 originate? The pound-note circulated for 17*s*. It was proposed to make by law the pound-note equal to 20*s*. Had it been proposed to make it 10*s*. the immorality would have been as great, but the burdens of the state less by one half. The purpose was to double

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those burdens, and it was accomplished, for the gold was increased in value by the new demand.* Could such things be done in the face of a people that had not been mystified by words?

Seeing that England, fighting for a phantom, has enacted against herself terrible laws which overpower the imagination by the enormity of the misery they bring, and the dark shadows of the consequences which they cast—what remains but to deal with her as one insane? The insanity is not in the brain, where it would be incurable, but in the tongue, where it is easy of cure when set about in the right way.†

When England becomes sane she will know that for tampering with coin the proper tribunal is the Old Bailey; it is too base a treason for the Tower! Then too she will know—that as guilty as the man who proposed such laws was, so was each man that assented to them,—and far more the Parliament who bargained for them,—bargained to suffer them as evils which they were conscious of, in exchange for the gratifying of hopes as criminal and as delusive.‡

You have taken as your standard of value two materials: the one, that which has undergone the greatest of all fluctuations; the other—*rags*, which you hold equal to gold, because "convertible," and

* The proposers of the measure declared that the loss to the nation in debt, taxes, &c. would be only 3 per cent.; to ground this assertion, £7,000,000 sterling were poured into the market at the Mint price while the Committee was sitting.—*See Sir J. Graham's "Corn and Currency."*

† "Wealth! It were well if the ambiguities of this word had done no more than puzzle philosophers. One of them gave birth to the mercantile system."—*Wheatley's Logic*, p. 232.

‡ See Sir James Graham's "Corn and Currency," where is shown that the House of Commons in 1819, bartered the Corn Laws against the Currency Laws.

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which you use *only* because it is not convertible: this you call the *sound principle* of a currency.

But Sir R. Peel has dug a second intrenchment behind the first in the citadel of fallacy. It is now no longer standard of value, but *ideal* standard. At least the debate (see correspondence with the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce and Mr. Ingleby's admirable letter) is now on the "IDEAL UNIT." To speak of an ideal standard is to assert that the standard in question is an *unreal* one.

Interwoven with the fallacy of "ideal unit" and "value standard," is now—who shall deny?—the very existence of England. Pauperism, hatred of class and class, class legislation, centralization of power, fictitious increase of public debt, danger of bank stoppage, fluctuations, foreign grain, panic, all spring from or depend on monetary laws, which could not exist if there were no discussion on those abstract points. There could be no such discussion if the nation could feel the senselessness of the terms *ideal, unit,* &c. The poor African may here help us, for he has an "ideal standard:" one real because *only* ideal.

This standard has a *name,* it is "BAR;"* originally derived from a bar of iron. They measure the iron by this standard in their minds—"a bar" is worth so many material bars, according to the changes of the market, of gold, or the pound of beads, or the dozen knives, or a sheep, or a slave. By this method changes in value are estimated whilst the operations of exchange are effected with the utmost ease. It is an Algebraic conversion of various values into one denomination, which not interfering with any one

* In different places there are different names—one is *Pæcsta,* from the Spanish.

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material or produce, and used to rate only, is invariable, and stands as a mathematical rule in the mind.

Having ascertained that the *amount* of money affects all value and all possessions, it follows that if the gold or paper were diminished the property of every man would be changed; he would receive more than his due, and pay more than his debt, and so the other way. Thus it is that the influx of precious metals by diminishing the nominal value of coin, has been considered so conducive to the emancipation of the people, the establishment of the rights and the extension of the enterprise and energies of Europe. It may be inferred, that a diminution of the precious metals would have the opposite effect; and in that case, no matter of graver consideration can be presented, and no announcement of more alarming import made than this—that the precious metals are diminishing, and that during the last quarter of a century the order has been inverted, and yearly accumulation made way for a yearly loss.

At the time of the establishment of the Roman empire, the sudden liberation of gold from the treasures of various empires, augmented the amount of money in circulation, in the space of fifty years, in nearly the same proportion as in Europe by the discovery of the mines of America. The change in the former period produced little effect; gold as it increased in abundance diminished in value, that was all. At the time of the discovery of America, the precious metals in Europe were reduced to less than one-tenth of their sum in the time of Augustus, say £35,000,000. Since that period the tide has set in, it has flowed for two centuries and a half, and the sum of precious metals amounted at the close of the

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first quarter of this century to above £800,000,000.* Then the ebb commenced again, and though we know it not, we are carried down, and may at any instant be left stranded.†

The decline of the precious metals no more affected the Roman empire, than their increase had formerly done. Observe and mark the breakers that for you will soon raise their head from out the sinking tide—the Roman empire *had no debt;* the taxes were paid in *corn rents,* and by *local assessments* in *kind;* the obligations of man to man were equally so adjusted; the OUNCE *of gold was not taken as a standard.* THE MONEY WAS REDUCED IN PROPORTION AS THE METAL BECAME DEAR. Suppose the Roman empire had been overwhelmed with a debt to be paid in a certain weight of gold—would it have required the aid of our ancestors to overthrow Rome? Suppose monetary laws had taken money itself as the standard of itself, and so fixed all contracts between man and man, all assessments, and all rents—would it then have been left to England and the nineteenth century to reveal the phenomenon of pauperism? From Augustus, striking the average between the two empires, Rome was for 700 years exposed to this progressive diminution of the precious metals; what, then, under our supposition, was not effected in one year, one generation, or one century, would be so in the next: expedient after expedient would be exhausted, the chain broken to-day, the burden cast off, would be the one reforged, the other reladen on the morrow;

* These treasuries were themselves the mines of Rome, Macedon, Egypt, France (Thoulouse alone yielded nearly £10,000,000), to say nothing of the derivative wealth from Spain and from the East, through the conquests of Carthage and Alexander.

† The recent discovery of the new supplies of gold has averted practically this contingency.—*Ed.*

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and if the delusion of "standard of value" continued to endure—facts pass, delusion endures—the fall of the Roman empire, whenever it did fall, would have been to succeeding ages an example of the effects of the "ideal unit," and of the "*Standard of Value!*"

This is the picture of what is coming for England—not for England alone—but for Europe. This will come if there were no cabinet at St. Petersburg, and not come the less surely or the more slowly because there is one.

The tide of metallic wealth now flows rapidly in the wrong direction, and the amount of the inverted ratio, as compared with its advance in the previous century, is between five and six millions sterling yearly. That advance had enabled us to bear up against the burden of taxation and the novelty of debt. Now the converse is before us: time, the alleviator and the remedier, has become the oppressor and the tyrant.

When there were former tamperings with the currency, that is, deterioration of the metal, it *was* a grievance, and there was redress, and if the King saw not to it the Parliament did—now it is not grievance, *and* the Parliament's doing. We are slaves, and of a novel breed. Other slaves suffer, because they cannot get redress—we, with a splendid army and fleet, because we do not think of it. Other slaves have tyrants over them—we, uniting the extremes of wealth and misery, find neither power in the one nor courage in the other. We do the work of inquisitor and victim, and furnish ingenuity and flesh. The tongue has done it all. The roar brings forth the monster. At the close of the seventeenth century, the word CREDIT SYSTEM brought forth *public debt*. At the beginning of the nineteenth,

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STANDARD OF VALUE stalked forth, and behind him come the realities he engenders—*Panic—Monetary Crisis—Bankruptcy—and Revolution.**

* A pamphlet, "Parliamentary Usurpations in respect to Money," published in June, 1849, when the monetary crisis seemed to have abated, predicted its subsequent intensity, and indicated those means of averting ruin afterwards adopted in the suspension of the Bill of 1844.

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X.—SUBDIVISION OF LABOUR.

THIS expression does not convey a fallacy, it insinuates a falsehood. As an expression it is whimsical and silly enough, for we should have to commence with *division;* and the sense implied is not a division of toil, but a union of crafts. However, let that pass. The faultiest language is always good enough for those who can use it. Let us come to the implication.

The Subdivision of Labour is the great boast of civilization: the completion of progress of mechanics—its sign in political science. Its merit consists in cheapness, and in that merit we have the grounds and reason for the assembling of the population in factories, and for the creating of a distinction between commercial and agricultural interests.

I was once the studious and humble disciple of Adam Smith. His work was my companion in travelling in the East, and I sought in it the light by which to read the circumstances around. After a period of struggle, I discovered that those circumstances afforded the light by which to see through the darkness of Adam Smith. This however was at the time scarcely more than a guess. The East and the West were different worlds, and perhaps Political Economy only belonged to Civilization. I returned to the West, and then discovered that political economy did indeed belong to

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civilization, being the nomenclature and classification of the social diseases it has itself produced.

In the Highlands of Scotland domestic manufacture is still a practice, and it is easy to compare by merely crossing a rivulet, the condition of two cottages in all other respects similarly situated: in the one of which the spinning-wheel is at work, and in the other of which the clothing is supplied by the slop-shop. In the one you have industry, sobriety, practical intelligence, the love of domesticity and well-being. In the other you have the reverse. The difference in mere money value will be about eight pounds a year. So much for the cheapness obtained by subdivision of labour. "It is not" said a Highland woman to me once, speaking of a neighbour, "that it is cheaper to go to the shop, but they are idle."

When a household makes for itself the labour costs nothing, for it is taken up at spare moments, and there is no household in which, if the habit existed, time could not be found for doing all its own work. But that habit can be maintained only by vigilance. Human nature is very prone to vice, and idleness is the parent of them all. When then the philosopher comes with a specious theory encouraging this vice, the habit of industry is exposed to very serious hazard: when in addition to these seductive phrases, fashions are introduced, and when the nobles and leaders sever themselves from intercourse with their people, frequent the capital and buy everything in shops—taste, attachments, and self-respect stand in equal jeopardy with the habits of industry. This is the history of England and of civilization.

The unit of the nation is not the man, but the

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family. The independence of the nation can reside only in the independence of the units—that independence consists in the use of its own hand. Civilization draws everything to the town, and makes each family dependant on the *factory:* to that den is not transferred that sanctification of the household by its easy tasks and varied occupations, which has now departed. In addition to all the rest, you divide the people into two hostile camps of clownish boors and emasculated dwarfs. Good heavens! a nation divided into agricultural and commercial interests calling itself sane—nay styling itself enlightened and civilized, not only in spite of, but in consequence of this monstrous and unnatural division!

To subdivide a man is to execute him, if he deserves the sentence, to assassinate him if he does not.—The subdivision of labour is the assassination of a people.

The following observations on the same subject are extracted from "The Pillars of Hercules:"—

"The comparison between home-made and shop-purchased goods cannot be instituted where the habit has been extinguished; the implements and the dexterity are wanting, and new habits have arisen, adjusted to the articles and stuffs that have been introduced. In the highlands however the old habits subsist, and a family clothed by its own home work, saves one-third. Of course, no cotton will be used when clothing will be home-bred wool and home-grown flax.

"The change in this respect is generally deplored; but it is considered as inevitable, no hand-labour being able to stand against machinery. Home-

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spinning *costs nothing*. Twenty pounds of wool converted unobtrusively into the yearly clothing of a labourer's family by its own industry in the intervals of other work. This makes no show; but bring it to market, send it to the factory, thence to the broker, thence to the dealer, and you will have great commercial operations, and nominal capital engaged to the amount of twenty times its value. The cloth so returned not half as durable, costs the labourer twice as much as it would have cost him in money, had he paid for spinning, weaving, &c. The working class is thus amerced to support a wretched factory population, a parasitical shop-keeping class, and a fictitious commercial, monetary and financial system. The landlord, for his share, pays five shillings per acre poor's-rates. This is the result not of "cheapness," but of delusion. The people of England were better clothed, and fed than at present, when there were no commerce and no factories. At this moment after exhausting human ingenuity, they are returning to domestic labour, as a means of remedying the evils of Ireland!

"Hallam has admitted that in those times which we look back on with pity, the labourer received twice as much as at present for his labour. This is a terrible blow and a fearful avowal. Mr. Macaulay, on the contrary, sees nothing but progress, hears of nothing but decay"—He must have transposed the two senses, or carefully selected the spots for indulging in their use; if indeed by progress he means approach towards a fair remuneration for labour, and by decay a falling away from just judgment in important concerns—or is it his purpose to cover Hallam's indiscretion?—"They say that in former times the people were better off. The time will come that they will say the same of this. If we be in a state of progress, those who speak thus must be very foolish, and if the proposition deserved notice, it required reputation."

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"But the Arab woman asked 'are your women happier than we?' The European lady would be shocked at the very possibility of comparison. She shrinks from domestic occupation, yet is she not able to expel nature, so as to despise Nausicaa and Naomi. We cannot refuse to bow before the shades of the heroic or patriarchal times—our nature acknowledges Abraham or Aleinous. Yet if our condition be that of refinement, how contemptible must be Fanaquil and her distaff, Penelope and her loom?

"An English lady who had the means of comparison, has not hesitated to assert that between an Eastern and a European household, the balance of happiness leans to the side of the former; and in the Eastern household it is certainly the women who have the larger share—who are the idols, and who possess authority such as belongs not to our courts, and affections on the part of those under their sway which belong not even to our dreams. The most touching words of the wisest of men are the description of the mistress of a household. It is an Arab woman he describes.

"Julia could work for her husband because there was then a noble and an antique costume. An empress, she could summon about her handmaidens, because there was a formula of ceremony which enabled all ranks to associate without derogation or familiarity. Then there was the hall to assemble in. 'The plant' still stood in every house. Because all this is gone, are we not to count the loss? If we cannot restore let us not mistake. If we cannot return let us not hurry on in the wrong direction. It is something to know whither we are going when the speed is the result of our own will.

"Nations are not changed by time or accident; they change themselves. Progress of society—march of intellect! good heavens! we can utter such trash and call ourselves reasonable beings: as well speak of the justice of a steam-engine or the virtue of a rocket. What need to examine their state;—their words

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suffice. When the phrases have gone mad, what can be in order?

"It is something in the midst of Empires crumbling to the earth and civilization gasping for breath and struggling with itself for life, to point to the permanency of single tribes who have never reasoned, but who have simple habits; and to be able to say to the wildly-frantic or to the meekly-deluded Christians, 'ye are incorrigible.'

"The plough, the yoke were 'the invention of gods and the occupation of heroes;' are the loom, the spindle, and distaff of less noble parentage? You sever the distaff and the plough, the spindle and the yoke, and you get factories and poor-houses, credit and panics—two hostile nations, agricultural and commercial. Poetry becomes politics, patriotism faction; and a light-hearted and contented people rusts into clowns and sharpens into knaves."

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XI.—DISCIPLINE.

We have transferred a term connected with the tutoring of ingenuous youth to the instruction given by a drill-serjeant to recruits. There is no ambiguity in this appropriation, and therefore there is no harm, except the harm that belongs to two names for the same thing, which renders every position perilous. Supposing we had been content with a pure military term, such as "drill," it would have remained for all times fixed to its special use and available for nothing else; the manner of shouldering a musket, dressing a rank, or wheeling a platoon, could never have disturbed the conscience or apprehension of any individual, civil or military. In a word, it could not have facilitated the issuing of an unlawful order by bamboozling those to whom it was issued. A man, by enlistment, is not freed from any law, he only has a new one imposed upon him; he is still the servant of the civil law, in addition to which he is the servant of the military law. In regard to the action of troops within the realm, these landmarks are respected: any soldier receiving an order which is unlawful, as for instance, to fire on a mob, he himself not being attacked, and the riot act not being read, knows full well that he will be hanged if he obeys; therefore no such order is ever given.

In regard to foreigners, the landmarks have been swept away. Between nations the riot act is the

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declaration of war; that form constitutes the state of war; without it, the soldier who draws a weapon is legally in the same predicament as he would be in the case above put at home. He is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court, and the facts being proved, the judge would call on him to show cause why sentence of death should not be passed upon him. The order of his officers would be no "cause,"—the only protection being the declaration of war, not in this case forthcoming. Every man employed in Afghanistan, in China, in Syria, in Spain, is liable to this process, being, in fact, a pirate.

Now, supposing that we had no such word as "discipline," the justification—"It is not for soldiers to reason," would not hold. People could not say "this is a matter of drill, and a soldier must obey." Every one would see that drill was one thing, and the nature of an order another; "discipline" being hazy and uncertain, those who admit these so-called wars to have been bad, hold the hands by which they have been perpetrated to be blameless.

On the immorality so engendered it is superfluous to dwell, but look on the danger that is incurred. The soldier ceasing to distinguish between a lawful and an unlawful order, unlawful orders are given by the officer without a moment's reflection, and unlawful measures are with equal facility adopted by the minister. No prior consent of the nation is required; no after penalties follow; no impediment stands in the way of execution. The minister can, and does at every moment, exercise a power of threatening foreign states, which renders him a despot as regards each weaker power. The stronger and abler powers have now the deepest inducement

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to gain an ascendency over his mind or will. It is this which gives such terrible efficiency to diplomacy, and all from the use of a term classical and candid.

THE DUKE OF YORK ON UNLAWFUL ORDERS.

At the table of the Commander-in-Chief not many years since a young Officer entered into a dispute with Lieutenant Colonel —— upon the point to which Military Obedience ought to be carried. 'If the Commander in Chief,' said the young officer, like a second Seid, 'should command me to do a thing which I knew to be civilly illegal, I should not scruple to obey him, and consider myself as relieved from all responsibility, by the commands of my Military Superior.'—'So would not I,' returned the gallant and intelligent Officer, who maintained the opposite side of the question; 'I should rather prefer the risk of being shot for disobedience, by my Commanding Officer, than hanged for transgressing the laws, and violating the liberties of my country.' 'You have answered like yourself,' said his Royal Highness, whose attention had been attracted by the vivacity of the debate, 'and the Officer would deserve both to be shot and hanged that should act otherwise. I trust all British Officers would be as unwilling to execute an illegal command, as I trust the Commander-in-Chief would be incapable of issuing one.'—*Sir Walter Scott's Memoir of the Duke of York in the Edinburgh Weekly Journal.*

LAWFUL ORDERS IN ROME.

Numa instituted several sacred orders. The Feciales, who were like the Irenophylakes or guardians of the peace among the Greeks, had, I believe, a name expressive of their

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office, for they were to act and mediate between the two parties, to decide their differences by reason. The Greeks called such a peace Irene, as puts an end to strife not by mutual violence, but in a rational way. In like manner the Feciales, or heralds, were often despatched to such nations as had injured the Romans, to persuade them to entertain more equitable sentiments; if they rejected their application they called the gods to witness, with imprecations against themselves and their country, if their cause was not just, and so they declared war. But if the Feciales refused their sanction, it *was not lawful for any Roman soldier*, nor even for the king himself to begin hostilities. War was to commence with their approbation, as the proper judges whether it was just, and the supreme magistrate was to deliberate concerning the proper means of carrying it on. The great misfortunes which befel the city from the Gauls, proceeded from the violation of these sacred rites. For when those barbarians were besieging Clusium, Fabius Ambustus was sent ambassador to their camp with proposals of peace in favour of the besieged, but receiving a harsh answer, he thought himself released from his character of ambassador, and rashly taking up arms for the Clusians, challenged the bravest man in the Gaulish army. He proved victorious, indeed, in the combat, for he killed his adversary and carried off his spoils; but the Gauls having discovered who he was, sent a herald to Rome accusing Fabius of bearing arms against them, contrary to treaties and good faith, and without a declaration of war. Upon this the Feciales *exhorted the senate to deliver him up to the Gauls*, but he applied to the people, and being *a favourite* with them, was screened from the sentence. Soon after this the Gauls marched to Rome, and sacked the whole city except the Capitol.—*Plutarch.*

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XII.—KNOWLEDGE—WISDOM.

"It is not fleets and armies, it is not wealth and possessions, that constitute the strength of states, but it is watchfulness." Thus spoke the greatest of patriots, and the first of orators. At a period but little removed from national extinction, this statesman had to labour to destroy in his countrymen, *confidence* in *wealth, strength,* and *dominion;* and to combat their minds' pride of intellectual endowments. The necessity and the fruitlessness of the warning were proved by the consequences. A state, proud of wealth, and possessed of greatness, sunk in decay; men, pre-eminent for every intellectual endowment, were unable to avert or even to perceive it! These are the lessons taught the boys, and forgotten by the men of Europe.

In England, at the present day, there is a sedate and sneering confidence derived from the possession of wealth, which closes the mind to care; we do not conceive it possible that scientific acquirements can coincide with national decay, or classical attainments with corruption. Yet it would seem to require but a moment's reflection to perceive that the mental processes required for science are distinct from those which are necessary to detect error in thought, on which depends that judgment which makes men upright and nations long-lived.

In science we proceed from experimental data: we add or subtract quantities ascertained; the

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results remain in hand positive and tangible; further, we test our work by the results obtained by other methods. The results in themselves stand distinct from the mental faculties involved in the process; high attainments in the one, and useful consequences in the other, who can gainsay or despise? But mathematical acquirements are not all that are requisite to form a man or to constitute a state, and the wealth and power which may be the result of their application is not a defence for the community, but rather is an increase of danger, if there be deficiency in the sense necessary for its proper use or its absolute protection.

In moral or political science, it is a process of a very different order that is called into action. Here we start from no ascertained data, and we obtain no tangible results. The useful process in morals would be the detecting and rejecting of false quantities included in our words, and woven into the very language which we speak. Wherever there has been a man capable of grappling with ruin, *he has found his enemy in the loss of the true value of words.*

The habit of thought of a mathematician, brought to bear on politics and morals, gives us this result, that he proceeds from error as data, for he begins with words, and then fights with these false implements with all the logical sternness of men who are certain in their process, because certain in their data. In individual cases we do not fall into the error of supposing that knowledge of one kind serves for another purpose. No statesman would think of employing an astronomer or an abstract calculator in the negociation of a treaty, or in the settlement of a question of national right and law, and yet the results and the habits of thought of the mathema-

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tician are conceived to be a protection to the whole state. Knowledge, therefore, does not necessarily coincide with clear and defined judgment, which is wisdom, unity, patriotic zeal and affections. Of these we see few indications to-day, and yet science abounds. Every man is instructed, in a degree unheard of at any previous time in any country, or in this, in literary and scientific attainments; yet every man is at war with his neighbour.

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XIII.—CONSERVATIVE AND REFORMER.

"Whig" and "Tory" were two good, rough, serviceable words: they were, in fact, names and names at least so far honestly acquired, that they were not assumed by the parties but given to them by their antagonists.*

The titles we have substituted for them are not names, but qualifications. Each has assumed it for itself, to convey an insinuation: the value of each consists in being false. Had the implication been correct, the names would not have been invented: the merit of art which they display lies in this, that the so-called Reformers have reformed nothing, and the so-called Conservatives have preserved nothing.

The change, however, could not have been effected, unless the parties had been sick of themselves and ashamed of their name. It is a pity that they cannot proceed a step further and be ashamed of any name. Every name implying the adoption of a borrowed opinion, reveals in each individual who assumes it the

* Whig, or Whaig, is the Scotch for Whey, which became a sobriquet of drovers, and a representative of bandits. It was first applied as a nick-name to those who attempted to resist the oppressions practised against Scotland.

Tory came from "*toory*," in Irish "give me," and, like the "perdioses" of Spain, was applied to beggars and then to outlaws. It became the sobriquet of those who resisted the oppressions of Ireland.

In both cases the contemptuous appellation was accepted with pride by those to whom it was applied: in both cases it represented in the origin justice and integrity.

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absence of character, originality, thought,—in a word of self.

The other terms with which we have been dealing, have the fine intricacy of an organic disease which it requires the microscope to detect, the artist's pencil to pourtray, and pathological science to investigate. These are gross and vulgar daubs, fitted only to illustrate a hustings' cry.

XIV.—REPRESENTATIVE AND CONSTITUENT.

"Represent" and "Constitute" are old and good terms, only the meaning is changed.

"To present" and "presentment" were equivalent to "verdict." The popular courts presented the grievances of the people: these being reproduced or represented in Paliament, the Knights of Shires and Burgesses were the representatives of those grievances.

The bodies in making these presentments commenced "constitutum est." The French have still preserved the word "constaté" or established by evidence. That which was constituted was the grievance, and those who represented it were the elected of the Shires and Boroughs.

To-day, the elected represent opinions, and constituents are the voters for such representatives.

In these lines are traced the picture of England as it was, and as it is.

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XV.—HAPPINESS.

This term may appear to have little connection with politics, but after all, is it not the end we look to in all that we do? Is it not at once the sign of success in government and the source of tranquility and stability of constitution? The formula of the greatest of formulists is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." If all our terms have proved ambiguous and deceptive, shall we expect this one to be clear and precise?

Happiness is like the rest, not the sign of a distinct idea, but a producer of indistinct ideas. It is the foundation of the different systems of philosophy, at war as to the sources of that happiness, which is but the expression of feelings varying in every man, constant in no man, and shifting from age to age alike in the mass and in the unit.

We have here the advantage of dealing with a native term; it comes from "hap" or "happen," means chance and implies luck. It is no other than good fortune, only that being made abstract, it is the state of good fortune or good fortuneship. In French it is "bonheur;" in German (glückheit) pure "luck;" in Greek the word may be rendered "happy influence" (good dæmon); in Latin the word if not primitive is at least insoluble to us, but the application is always made in the sense of good fortune.

In the original, therefore, the name had reference to external circumstances and not to internal affections. As in other instances we have displaced what

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we had to observe, substituting for it the condition of our own minds. There was in its primitive sense no idea beyond that of the thing which had happened to us, and there was therefore no philosophico-egotistical discussion.

It is this class of words which Socrates has most elaborately and beautifully dissected, showing the necessity of reversing the order of abstraction and of distributing them back again upon their objects.

Happiness taken in the sense of enjoyment, can be no more seized and examined than the rainbow. No man knows his own enjoyment, because he has no means of rating it against that of another. Though his speech is absolute, his meaning is relative, comparing his feelings at one period and another, or as excited by this object and by that. This does not prevent him from dogmatizing to the extent of rating political institutions, by what he gratuitously imagines, would or would not be his own happiness, under circumstances with which he is not acquainted.

One, and perhaps the most grievous, effect is, the extinguishing of our chief means of correction and instruction—the knowledge of our own past history. We think of it in reference to social manners, and deciding in the manner above stated, the condemnation is transferred to the whole.

When we look back we are always struck with formality, which to our habits, and consequently to our feelings, is a sign of unhappiness. From the knowledge of parallel societies, I can state that habits of politeness produce happiness, as compared with societies in which forms are disregarded. Seeing on both sides of the curtain, I assert the English people to be the most unhappy, excepting the Americans

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with whom I am acquainted, by reason of that very freedom of manner in which they consider their enjoyments to exist.

Formality and politeness call forth the latent sensibilities of the heart, in the flow of which resides the chief enjoyments of man. It is not as being the object of them, but as being the fountain of them that this gratification is experienced. When these forms are suppressed, self-love takes their place, with it comes pride; these have their gratifications. When we observe a society of which deference and respect are the rule, we erroneously imagine that its enjoyments consist in the mere gratification of those passions.

The mean mind looks for inferiors, the noble for superiors. So the race. The quarrelling one seeks to domineer; the polished one to venerate. Independence and equality are the shibboleths of a vulgar people; politeness the attribute of a refined one.

If we look then to test the institutions of a country by the amount of happiness they produce, how shall we proceed? In my "opinion" it may be that, in which the various grades of society are linked together, where the family bond is strong, and where a chain of dependence establishes the observance of man for man from the highest to the lowest. But how shall I accord with a man whose "opinion" is that happiness* is to be found only where the nation is a mass of isolated units or a mountain of sand?

It is however indubitable, that we in England have now returned to the primitive idea of happiness,

* In Chinese the signs of happiness are a stork, a Mandarin, and a child, implying what is useful, what is necessary, and what is simple. The stork destroys serpents, the Mandarin punishes the transgressor, and the child is innocence.

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—that is fortune: fortune for us is money. Avarice grows upon a man with years, and in proportion as his other enjoyments cease; to say that a man loves money, is to say that he has lost all other and better loves. To me, therefore, this selection, in regard to the object of happiness, is a confirmation of what I have observed in the habits of the people.

But how does the argument stand for those, who taking wealth as the means of happiness, would apply it as a test of fortunate institutions? England is the country which produces and possesses most wealth, and, in this sense, the greatest amount of happiness. But we are not dealing with aggregate wealth, and with abstract happiness. We are considering the state of individual men. One eighth of the whole population of England is pauper, and the country that possesses the most wealth, is the one in which there is the largest number of individuals suffering want and misery.

We owe to a wonderful combination of material circumstances, and to a not less remarkable "progress" (here, that word has sense,) in science, a facility of producing wealth unparalleled in any other age or time. This is independent of our institutions, but our institutions interfere to effect the distribution of that wealth, accumulating it in the hands of a few, and leaving the rest more unequally apportioned, and thereby more reckless, more discontented, and more unhappy, than in those states which we despise for their poverty and their laws.

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XVI.—EXPLETIVES.—TRIVIAL AND PROVERBIAL EXPRESSIONS.

"Le style c'est l'homme."—*Voltaire.*

I HAVE seen such proof that the character could be read in the handwriting, that I must admit the result, though I do not comprehend the process. What can be less comprehensible than that the spiritual and moral being should be rendered palpable by the fluctuations of the nerves of the fingers? Our lives are spent in dealing with each other and managing each other: yet the ablest amongst us are only peeping into their fellows, like children into wells. Rare indeed the instance are of those qualified to see clearly therein. When one so qualified does appear, he is known as a ruler or a founder of rule. This he can effect only by influencing those nearest to him, and men can only influence those whom they have judged. That knowledge in which the mastery of men resides, comes not by intuition, but by observation.

For great performances of course great faculties are required; but still crude genius can effect nothing: even the most powerful mind, being original, has to commence by creating for itself its method. That method, when found, benefits the weakest. All method rests on watchfulness, and whoever is intent, rises out of the sphere to which otherwise he would belong.

It has often been remarked that nations and tribes who are ignorant, and whom we call barbarous or

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even savage, possess infinitely higher powers of discrimination than ourselves, in regard to individual character. The difference between them and us is that they are more observant. They are so not because of a different method, but because their faculties are not absorbed and expended in forms of speech. In all practical dealings of man and man, we are children in their hands. They are able to judge of us; we are unable to judge of them; we are occupied in reasoning, they intent on observing.

Between ourselves the facilities are much greater than for the strangers to whom I have referred, for we speak the same language and our speech is incessant. He who can observe has the words of others just as the reader of handwriting has the strokes of their pen.

We have hitherto been dealing with mutations in the matter of language as destroying the judgment of nations. Here we descend to an inferior application, but which serves not less to show its hold over the human mind. The first tone gives you the singer, the first glance the age of the individual. Three words suffice to give you the character of a man, and that independently of the meaning they convey.

A language contains some forty or fifty thousand terms. The motions of mind seeking vent in speech, are in number infinite, and in power and inflexion not comprisable in any terms of any language. Wherever we pass beyond object and person, substantive and pronoun, we enter into a region vague and indefinite, through which the linking of sound and sense, implies action of the temperament and character, no less than of the intelligence. When then on these points, you lie in wait for men, and

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can but make them speak, they must be at your mercy. You have here a separate physiognomy to look at, whilst at the same time you have that of the features to assist and correct your observation.

A word insignificant as to meaning, and unconsciously used by the speaker, is of all others, indicative of his dispositions. These we know under the name of expletives, generally understood as applying to adjectives, because no one considers interjective adverbs as worthy of enumeration. Men have their tricks of sound, no less than of habit, and the minutest matters are always the most important, because of most common occurrence, and including every grade of capacity. On what lips will you not find "in fact," "in fine," "in truth," "really," "indeed," &c.?

At the first moment of addressing a stranger, you are in presence of the scale of humanity, because you have to fix for him his grade in that scale. An expletive of any kind, classes a man, for a superfluous word at once brings him down to mediocrity. Any further interest you have with him, is merely in reference to his weaknesses and his failings. From that moment he becomes, if you are honest, your patient—if you are cynical, your plaything—if you are designing, your victim. He who has the habit of saying "really," you know to be trifling; "indeed," to be insincere; "rather," to be puzzled-pated; "in fine," to be loquacious; "in truth," to be doubled-faced; "quite," to be a schemer; and all to be destitute of judgment, because an habitual superfluity results from an anxiety to disguise, and an inability to conceal.

Expletive is derived from a Latin word, nevertheless it is not Latin: the absurdity would be too

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gross of using "full" as meaning "empty." It is an adjective: to make it into a substantive it would have to take the shape of expletiveness, but that would not do for the name of a part of speech. We like then the cheap course of adding the indefinite article "an," and so convert it into a particular designation for every neaningless word.

> "Whilst expletives their feeble aid do join,
> And ten low words oft creep in one long line."

Verbs active, or in the sense of action, are as solid as substantives in the first intention. When you say "he went," or "he came," you are as certain and algebraic as when you say "the chair," "the house." Such terms reveal nothing to any eye, however keen. But there are verbs unfallacious in themselves, which, in their application, betray weaknesses of character just as effectually as abstract substantives. These are those which a man selects to describe what passes in himself.

When a man hears something new, he will follow it, or he will not; he will possess himself of it, or he will not. In the first case he will ask further, in the latter he will speak of himself. The first belongs to the class of active intelligences, the second does not. The first will be known by the point of interrogation, the second by the particle "if," or "but." The first if satisfied, will say "I SEE." The second will say "*I think*," or "It occurs to me," "I doubt," "I suppose," &c. In every case you have the character of the man before you as completely as you have his face, when you force him into a selection between "I see," and "I think." The first is the simplest expression of the application of the mind to an

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object, the second the sign of inability to use the mind.

I could count upon the fingers of my two hands, and leave some of them inappropriated, the persons whom I have heard use the word "I see." It has also happened that persons who had begun in the ordinary strain, "I think," "I suppose," &c. have come to "I see," without this explanation. This to me has been as the blow of a drowned man, the sign of restored animation.

The temperaments of nations are, in like manner, evinced and created. The Turks always say, "I see," "It is true," "It is certain." The Greeks and Arabs, like us, employ expletives and superfluities. The Athenians were loquacious, and the Spartans laconic, although they both spoke Greek. The French gesticulate, the English do not, although philologically the two languages are classed together.* Who

* "I have been often struck with the facility which, as compared with other Europeans, an Englishman possesses of making his way amongst the Turks. A Frenchman, whose character of mind must be, to the eye of an Eastern, closely allied to that of the Englishman, seems at once marked as one with whom no sympathies can exist. The nervelessness of the French language has, I conceive, given to those who speak it a loudness of tone and extravagance of gesture, which are intolerable to the sensitive nerves and the high-breeding of an Eastern gentleman.

"A Frenchman says, 'J'aime.' It is replied to him, 'You do not.' The French language not affording vocabular means of strengthening the assertion, he can only reiterate, 'J'aime!' but he does so in a louder tone: he calls to his aid the muscles of his arms as well as those of his throat. The Englishman says, 'I love.' The proposition is denied. He retorts with lowered tones, and with perfect calmness, 'I *do* love.' His language affording him the means of strengthening his assertion without the assistance of intonation or of action, it is by the suppression of display that he can best reach the conviction of others."—*Spirit of the East*, vol. I, p. 373.

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can follow the endless effects produced by aphorisms which have become habitual.* Who can detect the dominion under which we lie even to interjections? Were I to reduce to a single head the symptoms of social disease under which we labour, it would be *vulgarity*, for its opposite, politeness, contains the cure, even of our mental disorders. A really polite man would never, even in debate, state to his antagonist, what he knows he already knows. By this rule discussion would cease to be infection, and would become useful. Vulgarity is innoculated by interjections, "Pooh, pooh," "Eh!," "I say,"† and so forth.

The adult guilty of such coarseness deserves not to touch our sympathies; but what are we to feel in reference to the boy who, looking up to his elders and his parents, is degraded by his very respect to their level? The sounds to the man become the thought to the child.

Our language makes us what we are, converting men into the mere accidents of chance. It is only after he has mastered it for himself that he can be said to be himself; until then he has no soul but his tongue.

The mind once so quickened, intercourse with our

* The missionary Huc, in his work on China, mentions as interesting to those "who see in language causes of national peculiarities," the Chinese aphorism, "Make thy heart little," as contrasting with the French one, "prends guarde," which is not translatable into English—the one as producing a cowardly, the other a martial spirit.

† "How vast is the improvement of the present age when any wise thing can be put down by two words which have no meaning, '*pooh pooh*.'"—*Lord Ponsonby*.

In our fashionable novels we now have "Eh?" introduced at every turn, converting every sentence into a question, and exhibiting such insolence, as the manner of being of persons *comme-il-faut*.

So struck has been a polite people like the Chinese by the "I say" of the English, that they use it for "Englishman."

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fellow-men acquires that increased interest which a landscape has for the geologist. He is constantly occupied with the commonest things. He can tell the nature of every soil, and the value of every rock. He can detect the hidden treasure in the dirt that the familiar boor treads under foot. The dealer however in rocks at best but classifies strata and opens mines. The geologist of the mind has a treasure to create to himself by exploring the recesses of the breasts of others. Then too does he penetrate to the fountain-heads of history, and future fate unrolls before him her mysteries.

God has given us powers of judgment; why should we talk as if we had none?

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XVII.—ANALOGY.

If anybody said, in English, that he reasoned by "counter-speech," the risible not the reasoning faculties of his auditor would be awakened.

Nothing can be understood save by understanding it, that is, by looking into it, and not talking about it. Nothing can be liker to a thing than the thing itself. No rational being therefore would try to find a thing like another, and set himself to cogitate thereon; and this is the most that can be made out of "reasoning" by analogy.

There is however one legitimate use of this process, as it is called, as an aid in expounding to others a case already understood. It is so available against what are called "preliminary objections." But we proceed differently. If an analogy is adduced, the adversary seizes upon it, and shifts it in a counter-sense. The propounder does not stop him and say, "I have used an analogy to facilitate your comprehension, not to increase your confusion. You may reject it, and there the matter drops; but I will not permit you to use it improperly." This would be to proceed logically, but there are no logicians now-a-days.

It is Southey, I think, who speaks of Butler's using the *sword* of analogy! Analogy is no weapon, far less an offensive one. It is not in that sense that Butler uses it. Analogy is the oil for the hinges of the doors of inquiry, to allow them easily to open.

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When that severe hall is entered, attention is awake, and silence reigns.

I may be permitted to seize the opportunity of illustrating the proper use of analogy in reference to the argument of this little volume.

Its proposition is—*Men cannot think and know not what thought is, until they ascend beyond the terms which are used as the signs of thought.*

The objector—I was going to say the blind objector, but every objector is blind—meets me by a preliminary objection. I answer, "Permit me to put to you an analogous case. You tell your cook to get salmon, and to boil it; to get beef and roast it. You know that you are ordering your dinner, not inventing cookery. You are not under this delusion, because you are aware that English cookery is one thing, French cookery another, and so forth. Your free-will you know to be exercised merely in reference to the matter, the manner being fixed for you. The affinities of ingredients, the influences of heat and vapour, the detail of mechanical appliances, would have to be possessed and practised by you in order to attain to an original cookery: then, and then only, would you *think* in matter of cookery. Failing to do this, your free-will is but an exercise of the memory. So in all moral and metaphysical matters. You must cease to recollect before you begin to think. You must know that your thoughts are of a certain country and a certain age, until entering into their elements, you think for yourself."

My objector is sure to answer, "You will admit that roast beef is a very good thing, and if it is good it is well conceived, and why are we to reject that which is good and well conceived?" On this I should rejoin, "An analogy is an aid proffered to an

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antagonist; you have either to reject it as inapplicable, or to accept it."

POSTSCRIPT.—ARCHBISHOP WHEATLEY.

After concluding the revision of the last paragraph, I happened to open Wheatley's Logic at page 177, and read the following passage:—

"*Every* question that can arise is, in fact, a question whether a certain predicate is, or is not, applicable to a certain subject, or *what* predicate is applicable, and whatever other account may be given by any writer, of the nature of any matter of doubt or debate, will be found ultimately to resolve itself into this. But sometimes the question turns on the meaning and extent of the *terms* employed, sometimes on the *things* signified by them. If it be made to appear therefore, that the opposite sides of a certain question may be held by persons not differing in their *opinion of the matter* in hand, then that question may be pronounced verbal, as depending on the different senses in which they respectively employ the terms. If, on the contrary, it appears that they employ the terms in the same sense, but still differ as to the application of one of them to the other, then it may be pronounced that the question is real —that they differ as to the opinion they hold of the *things* in question."

Let me interpret it.—

"Every discussion consists in, what is to be said of some thing, the thing being a word. Nevertheless, what is meant by the word has sometimes to be thought of: but that is an inferior matter, being merely verbal. The question is real only when the meaning is not considered."

Here is the definition of Logic, "the proper use of

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reason;"—by the man who assumes to have re-inaugurated in our age, that art and science, by means of which, he professes to put down "common-sense" and to show "the preferableness of systematic knowledge to conjectural judgments."* Its laws, according to him, "apply to every intellectual occupation of MAN *as* man:" first amongst these occupations he enumerates the Statesman. So far he does not differ from Aristotle, who equally defines man "political" and "logical."

I open this volume at another place and I read as follows: "Complaints have been made that Logic leaves untouched the greatest difficulties, and those which are the chief sources of error in reasoning, namely the ambiguity or indistinctness of terms" . . . . . "no art is to be censured for not teaching more than falls within its province . . To find fault with Logic for not instructing us in the full meaning or meanings of every term is as if one should object to the science of optics for not giving sight to the blind."† In every science the first step is the definition of terms, but what shall be said of a science of which the name is logic or the science of words, which repudiates definition? What of the logician who uses as an argument for its exclusion a false analogy and nothing more? The blindness for which Logic is the cure is not a natural ailment but the "ambiguity," which results from the loose application of terms.‡

* Preface, page xii.

† He is arguing here against Aldrich's claims for definition, the best, the only valuable part of his work.

‡ "Language has actually become a part of our intellectual constitution, the use (character) of it exerts an influence over the whole

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I dare not trust myself with this book of Archbishop Wheatley, or with others of the same stamp. The dipping into them involves one of two alternatives equally distasteful, volumes in answer, or the throwing down of the pen in disgust.

To have mastered the science of logic, and far more to have been its restorer, must imply the knowledge of its application; and as the science of navigation enables the navigator to find the place of the vessel in the ocean, so must this science of logic have enabled Archbishop Wheatley to find his country's position on the earth. He must be able to guide England and to detect her aberrations if she goes astray. Yet in what have resulted his labours and that of all the other logicians? Has one deflection in morals been exposed in the people, one error in conduct been denounced in the government? Have they so much as dreamt of their high functions as teaching a people how to live? It is in the midst of their unmeaning jargon, and as its necessary result, that every crime has found a palliatory reason, a justifying term, and a free course. "This would not have happened," as he says himself, referring to a subordinate matter, "if men had always kept in mind the meaning of the names they used." Yet this is not a mere logician; he is also a clergyman, and a primate

of our mental operations, and while it facilitates them in one sense does also in another impede and limit the play of our faculties, *and especially of the highest of those faculties. The constant presence of words in the mind slackens its curiosity*, by leading it to believe that in fact it knows what in fact it does not know; *it renders also its perception of all abstract truths obscure and confused*, in so far as the rude symbol of each idea is taken in the stead of the idea itself, and carries with it its concretions, its excess and its defects, and its accidental associations."—*Taylor's Physical Theory of another Life*, p. 150.

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of a church. But when the schools cease to detect error, how should the Church denounce sin: if being such men we call ourselves logicians, why should we not call ourselves Christians?*

This leads me to a reflection which may not inappropriately close this volume. Logic is not the only field which has recently been cultivated with earnestness and assiduity by men of rare ability. England, France, Germany have rivalled each other, for the last quarter of a century or more, in the application of human faculties to the improvement of man in every branch of study, in every walk of life, in every condition of society.

In our own country alone, the enumeration of the men who have attained to reputation or to fame would fill pages. From the Universities, from the ranks of the People, in the bosom of the Church, among the leaders of political life, we have had a breaking away from the ties of habit, and the chains of interest, and an earnest and laborious devotion to the pursuit o truth; to that extent have honest intentions triumphed over dishonest associations that even political struggle has itself given way, and it can no longer be said that parties exist in the state. We now inquire how man shall be consistent in his faith, just in his conclusions, conscientious in his conduct, benevolent in

* The work of Archbishop Wheatley contains the conjoint labours of Dr. Copleston and Mr. Newman. When urging upon the latter, before he had quitted the Church of England, the practical duties involved in the teaching of the men who were to be the rulers of England, whom he had to instruct not only in what was just, but in the manner of being just at this particular time, he answered me, "On examining the history of England, I find her predominating character to be that of injustice, which must consequently be the element of her future life." He has since been lecturing on the partition of Turkey in the interest of Christianity!

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his nature, profitable in his benevolence, dutiful in the exercise of his rights, observant in the performance of his duties—how he shall render the stores of his imagination a fountain of charity to his fellow-men—how he shall relieve the burden to the oppressed, how he shall elevate the lowly in condition—how he shall enlarge the homestead of freedom—how he shall put far away wrong, violence, oppression—how he shall remove the causes and mitigate the effects of strife and war. But in all this not a single trace is to be discovered of an application to the conduct of our Nation as a Nation.

From Archbishop Wheatley to Carlyle—from Gladstone to Mills, there is not a sentence to be found going beyond an assumption of what men are; it is those who have assumed the style and title of instructors, who, boldly maximizing what is done, have inaugurated Atheism in principle and practice.

On the other hand, the works, the most attractive, and therefore the most influential romances and books of personal adventure, are successful almost in proportion to the scorn with which are treated our intellectual faculties, and our national habits. But aberrations not being traced to a cause, the truths conveyed are but dreamer's fictions and traveller's tales. The reading public is only justified in sneering, and the nation is divided into dogmatists and scoffers.

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ERRATUM.—Page 116 note—*for* 1849 *read* 1847.

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